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Andrew Fels*

Voiding the Federal Analogue Act
ABSTRACT
Accordingly, [King Rex] announced to his subjects that he had written out a
code and would henceforth be governed by it in deciding cases, but that for an
indefinite future the contents of the code would remain an official state secret,
known only to him and his scrivener. To Rex’s surprise this sensible plan was
deeply resented by his subjects. They declared it was very unpleasant to have
one’s case decided by rules when there was no way of knowing what those rules
were.1
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The Federal Analogue Act
A controlled substance analogue shall, to the extent intended for
human consumption, be treated, for the purposes of any Federal law
as a controlled substance in schedule I.2
[T]he term “Controlled substance analogue” means a substance—
(i) the chemical structure of which is substantially similar to the chemical
structure of a controlled substance in schedule I or II;
(ii) which has a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central
nervous system that is substantially similar to . . . a controlled substance in
schedule I or II; or
(iii) with respect to a particular person, which such person represents or intends to have a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central
nervous system that is substantially similar to . . . a controlled substance in
schedule I or II.3
2. 21 U.S.C. § 813(a).
3. 21 U.S.C. § 802(32)(A).
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INTRODUCTION

If the Federal Analogue Act (Analog Act)4 is to be applied evenly
and consistently, regardless of race or class, against all defendants for
possessing any analog substance, chocolate must be recognized as the
legal equivalent of heroin. Selling brownies at a bake sale, drinking a
mug of cocoa, or buying cookies from a Girl Scout can be punished as
though the chocolate were an equivalent quantity of a
methamphetamine mixture.5 The Analog Act criminalizes substances
that are “substantially similar” to scheduled narcotics in structure
and effect and intended for human consumption. “Substantially similar” has no coherent or standardized definition, so it ultimately means
whatever the jury or judge desires. In United States v. Makkar, Justice Neil Gorsuch, then a circuit judge for the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals, questioned whether the courts should finally void the Analog
Act based on the vagueness of the phrase “substantially similar.”6
This Article answers in the affirmative. Despite almost every federal
court having deemed it constitutional, the Analog Act should be
voided at the earliest opportunity.
The Analog Act violates the traditional void-for-vagueness doctrine
because no one can realistically know in advance what the Analog Act
outlaws or the punishment for violations; even scientists and drug experts—including the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)—routinely disagree on which substances qualify as analogs. All substances
are neither legal nor illegal until a jury reaches its verdict, but because analog status is a fact found by the jury, prosecutions routinely
reach opposing conclusions regarding the legality of the same substance. By criminalizing even mundane substances, the Act casts too
wide of a net, making any enforcement arbitrary. As illustrated by the
circuit splits both preceding and following the Supreme Court’s only
Analog Act decision, McFadden v. United States,7 no scienter requirement has proven capable of effectively narrowing the Act’s scope.
In addition to its unconstitutional vagueness, the Analog Act violates separation of powers principles. Only Congress has the power to
criminalize substances. The Analog Act impermissibly delegates this
power, effectively forcing the judicial branch to criminalize analogs
4. While “analogue” is the common spelling in British English, this Article employs
the American English spelling “analog” to conform with the spelling used by most
of the cited sources. See Analogue, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://
www.oed.com/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/7029 [https://perma.cc/47UT-88J5] (last
visited Sept. 14, 2021).
5. More precisely, chocolate is illegal under the Analog Act for anyone knowing that
chocolate is illegal, even if the underlying reasons for its illegality remain unknown. See infra Part V; U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 (U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N 2004).
6. United States v. Makkar, 810 F.3d 1139, 1143 (10th Cir. 2015).
7. 576 U.S. 186 (2015).
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temporarily on an inefficient and ad hoc basis. As a prosecutorial tool
and deterrent, the Analog Act failed to stop the rise of synthetic cannabis, bath salts, and fentanyl analogs. By ignoring the rise of
fentanyl analogs and other known drug threats, congressional inaction cost an untold number of lives.
Aligning American drug law with constitutional norms and protecting public health require voiding the Analog Act. The DEA and
Congress have proven their ability to regulate dangerous psychoactive
substances effectively without relying on the statute. Voiding the Act
would remove a real threat to the emerging industries of legal cannabis and psychedelic therapy while also forcing law enforcement to focus on genuinely dangerous substances.
Part II of this Article presents three different scenarios encapsulating the Kafkaesque experiences of both Analog Act defendants and
enforcers. Part III introduces the Analog Act, the Act’s structure and
history, and the traditional void-for-vagueness doctrine. Part IV explains why the substantial similarity requirement renders the statute
unusable. Part V explores the circuit split over the Act’s scienter requirement and the Supreme Court’s failure to resolve this ambiguity
in McFadden. Part VI examines the Act under the Johnson vagueness
doctrine. Part VII analyzes the hazards created by the statute’s continued existence. Part VIII first dispels the myth of rapid drug development originally used to justify the Analog Act and then surveys the
existing alternate enforcement mechanisms.
II. ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE ANALOG ACT’S FAILURES
The following three scenarios best convey the failures of the Federal Analog Act.
A.

First Scenario

Imagine that you are Iqbal Makkar.8 You are an Indian-born naturalized citizen in your mid-thirties living with your family in the rural
Midwest and working at your family’s convenience store, the Gitter
Done Store.9 You pay your taxes, sponsor a local baseball team, and
donate supplies to firefighters and police.
Your store sells the same legal psychotropic drugs—caffeinated
beverages, alcohol, and nicotine products—as the local white-owned
stores. Like other stores, yours also sells a product described as “in8. This first scenario is based on the facts of United States v. Makkar, No. 13-CR0205, 2014 WL 1572394 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 18, 2014), rev’d, 810 F.3d 1139 (10th
Cir. 2015).
9. See Defendants’ Joint Trial Brief at 2, Makkar, 2014 WL 6068477 (No. 13-CR0205).
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cense” and prominently labeled “not for human consumption.”10 The
incense manufacturer repeatedly assured you that the incense was legal, although it is understood that some purchasers are smoking the
incense as a quasi-legal alternative to cannabis.11
You suspend sales of the incense when you learn that the state
might soon outlaw the incense, and you ask the assistant district attorney to determine what substances the incense contains.12 The local
assistant district attorney declines, assuring you that any prosecution
would target the incense distributors and not the retailers.13 The assistant district attorney does not advise you to stop selling the
incense.
One year later, law enforcement raids your store. At trial, evidence
of your attempted compliance with the law is excluded.14 Prosecutors
argue that your knowledge of the incense’s effects makes you guilty of
drug distribution despite your ignorance of the actual chemical composition of the incense itself.
You are convicted. Your business, car, bank accounts, and property
are forfeited.15 Your sentencing report recommends punishing you as
though you had distributed over 45,000 pounds of marijuana.16 After
a community letter-writing campaign, including a letter of support
from the local mayor, you receive a relatively lenient sentence of
ninety-seven months in prison.17
Numerous Oklahoma storeowners sold the same incense; some of
these other storeowners even testified at your trial.18 But the only two
people federally indicted for selling the once-ubiquitous incense are
you and your employee, who is also of East Indian descent.19
B.

Second Scenario

Next, imagine that you are an employee of the Outer Edge, a company manufacturing and distributing a smokable herbal mixture.20
10. See Appellant Iqbal Makkar’s Opening Brief at 28, Makkar, 810 F.3d 1139 (No.
13-CR-0205), 2015 WL 849413.
11. See id. at 4–8.
12. See Defendants’ Joint Trial Brief, supra note 9, at 3.
13. See id. at 4.
14. See Appellant Iqbal Makkar’s Opening Brief, supra note 10, at 9.
15. See Order for Entry of Forfeiture Money Judgment and Preliminary Order of Forfeiture of Property at 2–4, United States v. Makkar, No. 13-CR-0205 (N.D. Okla.
Apr. 18, 2014).
16. See Response to Defendant Makkar’s Objections to PSIR at 7, United States v.
Makkar, No. 13-CR-0205 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 18, 2014), 2014 WL 6068535.
17. See Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 21, Makkar, 2014 WL 6068501 (No. 13CR-0205).
18. See Appellant Iqbal Makkar’s Opening Brief, supra note 10, at 28.
19. See id. at 43–44.
20. This second scenario is based on the facts of United States v. Picanso, No. 1440005 (D. Kan. 2014). See Branden A. Bell, Not for Human Consumption: Vague
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Your employer appears legitimate: they pay taxes, maintain a staffed
office, openly advertise their products, attend trade shows, and supply
dozens of retailers across the county.21 Your concerns about the legality of the company’s product were allayed by assurances from your
employer’s lawyers that it complies with state and federal law and
independent laboratory test results confirming that the product does
not contain any federally scheduled narcotics.22
You and your coworkers—including “salespeople, office managers,
and a delivery driver”—are indicted for distributing controlled substance analogs.23 Facing the threat of twenty years in jail, eleven out
of thirteen employees ultimately plead guilty to federal felonies and
are sentenced to federal prison.24 Only two employees go to trial. The
jury acquits the pair once evidence emerges showing that even the
DEA could not decide on the legality of the substances.25
C.

Third Scenario

Finally, imagine being a federal prosecutor attempting to combat
the national bath salts and Spice epidemics of the early 2010s. Openly
sold in gas stations and head shops throughout the country, both substances go undetected by drug tests but replicate the effects of illicit
drugs. The active chemicals in bath salts mimic the structures and
effects of MDMA26 or methamphetamine, while Spice contains synthetic cannabinoids mixed with smokable plant matter. Due to their
chemical makeup, both products pose even graver dangers than their
illegal counterparts.27
Both products likely contain chemicals outlawed by the little-used
Analog Act, but the statute’s opacity and demanding standards make
for an exceedingly complicated and challenging prosecution. Worse,
the Analog Act requires an analog’s illegality to be proven anew in
each prosecution. Due to law enforcement’s inaction, the products are
now a multi-billion-dollar industry, but cracking down would require a
diversion of scarce resources from more routine drug prosecutions that
promise a far better chance of conviction.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

27.

Laws, Uninformed Plea Bargains, and the Trial Penalty, 31 FED. SENT’G REP.
226, 229 (2019).
See Bell, supra note 20, at 229.
See id.
Id. at 230.
See id. at 230–31.
See id. at 231.
MDMA is “the technical name for the active ingredient in ecstasy.” Hari K.
Sathappan, Note, Slaying the Synthetic Hydra: Drafting a Controlled Substances
Act that Effectively Captures Synthetic Drugs, 11 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 827, 827
(2014).
See id. at 828 “In many cases, a controlled substance’s analogue can be much
more dangerous than the controlled substance itself.”).
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III. THE ANALOG ACT AND VOID FOR VAGUENESS
It is impossible to know the full range of substances criminalized
by the Analog Act. Instead of regulating specific chemicals in the manner of more conventional drug laws, the tripartite Analog Act
criminalizes every substance falling within its immensely wide scope.
The Act’s first part, § 802(32)(A), defines a “controlled substance analogue” as any substance:
(i) the chemical structure of which is substantially similar to the chemical
structure of a controlled substance in schedule I or II;
(ii) which has a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central
nervous system that is substantially similar to . . . a controlled substance in
schedule I or II; or
(iii) with respect to a particular person, which such person represents or intends to have a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central
nervous system that is substantially similar to . . . a controlled substance in
schedule I or II.28

A small number of courts have read these subsections disjunctively, deeming a controlled substance analog to be any substance falling within one of the three subsections.29 The majority of courts have
instead adopted a conjunctive reading of § 802(32)(A). Under the conjunctive reading, a substance is a controlled substance analog when it
satisfies subsection (i) and either subsection (ii) or subsection (iii).30
Section 802(32)(B) notes that the controlled substance precursors
listed in paragraphs (34) and (35)—industrial chemicals like safrole,
ephedrine, and ethyl ether—can still qualify as controlled substance
analogs.31 The Analog Act exempts only a narrow range of substances
from controlled analog status: (1) a controlled substance; (2) “any substance for which there is an approved new drug application;” (3) a substance subject to an exemption for investigational use; and (4) “any
substance to the extent not intended for human consumption before
such an exemption takes effect with respect to that substance.”32
The Act’s second part, § 813, provides that controlled substance
analogs “shall, to the extent intended for human consumption, be
28. 21 U.S.C. § 802(32)(A).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Greig, 144 F. Supp. 2d 386, 389–91 (D. V.I. 2001)
(adopting a disjunctive reading of § 802(32)(A)), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub
nom. United States v. Hodge, 321 F.3d 429 (3d Cir. 2003).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Forbes, 806 F. Supp. 232, 235–36 (D. Colo. 1992) (“The
scientific interdependence of molecular structure and effect on the central nervous system is consonant with the legislative history evidencing congressional
intent to establish a dependent, two-prong test.”). In a McFadden footnote, Justice Thomas hinted at a willingness to consider the propriety of the conjunctive
reading. McFadden v. United States, 576 U.S. 186, 194 n.2 (2015). Given the incredible breadth of the disjunctive reading, the conjunctive reading’s near-uniform acceptance should not be disturbed.
31. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(32), 802(34)(C), 802(34)(Q), 802(35)(D).
32. 21 U.S.C. § 802(32)(C).
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treated, for the purposes of any Federal law as a controlled substance
in schedule I.”33 Should the requirements of § 802 and § 813 be met,
the now-illicit controlled substance analog can be prosecuted under
any federal drug law, including the section prohibiting the knowing
manufacture or distribution of a scheduled substance34 and the section barring the possession of scheduled substances.35
The disjunctive interpretation of the Analog Act’s plain language
concludes that any chemical satisfying one of the three subsections in
§ 802(32)(A) may be treated as a controlled substance analog. The “or”
connecting § 802(32)(A)(ii) and § 802(32)(A)(iii) indicates that satisfying any one of the three separate requirements—substantial structural similarity, substantially similar effects, or representation of
substantially similar effects—makes a substance a controlled analog.
If employed, this disjunctive reading of the statute would encompass
even common legal psychotropics like coffee and alcohol.36 The legislative history of the Act does not explain whether Congress intended
this broad scope; the conjunction between the second and third subsections varied between different drafts of the bill, leaving congressional
intent unclear.37
The statute does not require any formal or public listing of a chemical as a controlled substance analog before a prosecution can commence,38 and courts have found that almost every prosecuted
substance qualifies as a controlled substance analog.39

33. 21 U.S.C. § 813(a). The human consumption requirement is why gas stations and
smoke shops peddling bath salts (synthetic cathinones) or Spice (dangerous,
smokable synthetic cannabinoids mixed with plant matter) label their wares as
“not intended for human consumption.” See, e.g., Jennifer A. Gershman & Andrea
D. Fass, Synthetic Cathinones (‘Bath Salts’): Legal and Health Care Challenges,
37 PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 571, 571 (2012). To weaken the legal protection
afforded by such labeling, a recent amendment to the Analog Act added a list of
circumstantial factors permitting inferences of intended human consumption. See
21 U.S.C. § 813(b).
34. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a).
35. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a).
36. See United States v. Forbes, 806 F. Supp. 232, 235–36 (D. Colo. 1992).
37. See United States v. Fedida, 942 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1274–76 (M.D. Fla. 2013)
(citing 131 CONG. REC. 19114 (1985)).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Cooper, No. 3:14-CR-014-J-20MCR, 2015 WL
13850123, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 2015) (“There is no requirement that a controlled substance analogue be formally or expressly listed anywhere before a person may be prosecuted under the law for its manufacture, distribution, or
possession.”).
39. See Gregory Kau, Comment, Flashback to the Federal Analog Act of 1986: Mixing
Rules and Standards in the Cauldron, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1077, 1104 (2008).
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Void for Vagueness

Originating from the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,40
the void-for-vagueness doctrine acts as a constitutional safety valve
for invalidating any criminal statute with “terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application.”41 Though the doctrine lacks precise boundaries,42 defendants challenging the Analog Act have typically relied on
Kolender v. Lawson’s two-part test. The test first looks to whether the
statute provides actual notice by “defin[ing] the criminal offense with
sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited.”43 Second, the statute must be sufficiently definite
such that it is not subject to “arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement,” allowing “policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their
personal predilections.”44 Laws failing either requirement are deemed
void.
Vague laws also violate the separation of powers. Only Congress
possesses the ability to “make an act a crime.”45 Vague laws impermissibly transfer this ability to unelected judges and police officers,
thereby “eroding the people’s ability to oversee the creation of the laws
they are expected to abide.”46 At its core, the Analog Act gives the
judiciary the responsibility of creating new drug laws on a temporary
and ad hoc basis.
Defendants have brought countless void-for-vagueness challenges
attacking the substantial similarity requirement of the Analog Act,47
arguing that the law’s failure to define the term “substantially similar” falls short of the actual notice requirement described in Kolender
v. Lawson.48 Courts have almost universally rejected these challenges. But a closer look at the Analog Act’s actual application reveals
that it criminalizes an incredibly broad range of actions while also
40. See generally Cristina D. Lockwood, Defining Indefiniteness: Suggested Revisions
to the Void for Vagueness Doctrine, 8 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 255, 266
(2010).
41. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012) (quoting Connally
v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
42. See generally Lockwood, supra note 40, at 256 (“The void for vagueness doctrine
is itself indefinite.”).
43. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
44. Id. at 357–58 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974)).
45. United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2325 (2019) (quoting United States v.
Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812)).
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1240–43 (S.D. Ala. 2003)
(rejecting a void-for-vagueness challenge), aff’d, 415 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2005).
Void-for-vagueness challenges are almost as old as the Act itself. See United
States v. Desurra, 865 F.2d 651, 653 (5th Cir. 1989).
48. Kolender, 461 U.S. 352.
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making it effectively impossible to have advance notice of what the
statute forbids.
B.

The Controlled Substances Act

Understanding the Analog Act’s incurable vagueness first requires
understanding its history and role within federal drug law. The primary justification cited for implementing the Analog Act was that
traditional drug laws like the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) could
not effectively prosecute black market chemists who invent and sell
new variations of existing narcotics.49
The CSA controls discrete substances by assigning them to one of
five persistent schedules based on their perceived risk of abuse and
medical utility.50 Drugs that are considered extreme dangers to public
health and have no medicinal value—including LSD, MDMA, heroin,
cannabis, and mescaline—are assigned to schedule I.51 Schedule II
drugs, like fentanyl and oxycodone, are deemed very dangerous, but
they also have some accepted medical uses.52 Scheduling a substance
requires either congressional action or, more commonly, formal
rulemaking, through which the Attorney General must weigh numerous statutory factors, including a substance’s risk of harm and its medicinal value.53
The Attorney General also possesses an emergency scheduling
power invokable when a substance poses “an imminent hazard to the
public safety.”54 Emergency scheduling places a substance on schedule I at least thirty days after the Attorney General announces the
action in the Federal Register and notifies the Secretary of Health and
Human Services.55 The emergency scheduling remains in place for
49. See, e.g., United States v. Washam, 312 F.3d 926, 933 (8th Cir. 2002) (asserting
that a purpose of the Analog Act was “to prohibit innovative drugs that are not
yet listed as controlled substances” (citing United States v. McKinney 79 F.3d
105, 107 (1996))); United States v. Fedida, 942 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1276 (M.D. Fla.
2013) (discussing Congress’s intent to close federal drug law loopholes); United
States v. Forbes, 806 F. Supp. 232, 238 (D. Colo. 1992) (“Congress declared that
the purpose of the statute is to attack underground chemists who tinker with the
molecules of controlled substances to create new drugs that are not yet illegal.”).
50. For an explanation of rule-based narcotics statutes, like the CSA, and standardbased narcotics statutes, like the Analog Act, see Kau, supra note 39, at 1087
(describing differences between rules and standards).
51. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., LISTS OF: SCHEDULING ACTIONS, CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES, REGULATED CHEMICALS (Aug. 2021) [hereinafter
DEA ORANGE BOOK], https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/schedules/orangebook/
orangebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/3SZY-K7PD] (listing all scheduled chemicals).
52. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(2); see also DEA ORANGE BOOK, supra note 51 (listing all
scheduled chemicals).
53. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 811(a)–(c).
54. 21 U.S.C. § 811(h)(1).
55. See id.
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two years with a possible one-year extension if the substance is in the
process of joining a permanent schedule.56 Once scheduled, a drug
takes its place in the DEA’s “Orange Book,” a publicly accessible and
regularly updated compilation listing all controlled chemicals under
the CSA by their chemical and common names.57
C.

History of the Analog Act

Congress passed the Analog Act in the wake of the first fentanyl
analog outbreak.58 In 1979 and 1980, a drug named China White contributed to the deaths of at least ten recreational drug users in California.59 Law enforcement forensic analysts discovered that China
White contained no illegal drugs but instead consisted of the opiate
alpha-methylfentanyl, a fentanyl analog, mixed with lactose sugar.60
To the great frustration of law enforcement, the bulk of the lethal
drugs fueling this first fentanyl crisis were, at the time, unregulated
substances falling outside of the CSA. The drugs were produced by
well-educated professional chemists moonlighting as recreational substance manufacturers. Drug-user deaths continued and stemmed from
an ever-widening range of exotic fentanyl analogs: parafluorofentanyl, 3-methyl-fentanyl, beta-hydroxyfentanyl, and
others.61
Because the drugs were unscheduled, prosecutors had few options
for criminal charges against these manufacturers. One DuPont chemist saw his sentence for selling 3-methyl-fentanyl vacated because 3methyl-fentanyl was not then a prohibited substance. A California
chemist and his co-conspirators were caught with sixty pounds of legal
fentanyl analogs intended for black market distribution, yet prosecutors could only proceed under the feeble criminal provisions of the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.62
At the time, the DEA dutifully scheduled new substances as it discovered them in illicit production,63 but the temporal gap between the
56. See 21 U.S.C. § 811(h)(2).
57. DEA ORANGE BOOK, supra note 51.
58. See generally United States v. Tyhurst, 28 M.J. 671, 673 (A.F.C.M.R. 1989), rev’d
in part, 29 M.J. 324 (C.A.A.F. 1989); Kau, supra note 39, at 1078.
59. See John J. Coleman, Special Report: Fentanyl Analogs in Street Drugs, PRESCRIPTION DRUG RSCH. CTR. 10 (Aug. 16, 2007).
60. See id. at 3, 11. The DEA added alpha-methylfentanyl to the list of schedule I
drugs in 1981. Id. at 12.
61. See U.N. Off. on Drugs & Crime, Recommended Methods for the Identification
and Analysis of Fentanyl and Its Analogues in Biological Specimens, U.N. Doc.
ST/NAR/53 (Nov. 2017).
62. See Coleman, supra note 59, at 12.
63. Alpha-methylfentanyl was added to schedule I on September 22, 1981; betahydroxyfentanyl was emergency scheduled on November 29, 1985, and it was
permanently added to schedule I in 1987. Fentanyl analogs continued to be
scheduled after passage of the Analog Act. See DEA ORANGE BOOK, supra note 51
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discovery of a drug on the black market and the drug’s scheduling created a loophole for the drug manufacturers. To prevent more analog
chemists from escaping prosecution, Congress drafted the Analog Act
to temporarily criminalize newly discovered designer drugs until the
DEA could complete all of the formal rulemaking procedures required
to schedule them formally.64 Once a drug completed the lengthy administrative process required for scheduling, it became subject to the
CSA and exempt from the Analog Act.
D.

The Analog Act as a Failed Prosecutorial Tool

As a threshold matter, it must be acknowledged that the Analog
Act simply does not work as intended and has proven incapable of
preventing or prosecuting the commercialization of designer drugs.
During Senate Judiciary Committee hearings in 2019, thirty-four
years after the statute’s passage, the Department of Justice openly
disparaged the statute’s utility as a law enforcement tool, characterizing its prosecutions as “time-consuming, resource-intensive, and difficult for investigators, drug testing laboratories, prosecutors, courts,
juries, and the entire criminal justice system” and filled with “technical and voluminous” filings addressing issues “simply not relevant to
routine controlled substance prosecutions.”65
The national bath salts and synthetic cannabis epidemics of the
past decade illustrate the DEA’s frustrations with the statute. Around
2008, packets of synthetic cannabis began appearing for sale in head
shops, gas stations, and convenience stores across the United States.
Often called Spice or K2, synthetic cannabis was a mixture of smokable plant material and a synthetic cannabinoid—such as JWH-018,
UR-144, or XLR-11—capable of mimicking cannabis’s psychoactive effects.66 Although they were dangerous for consumers, synthetic cannabinoids had one chief advantage: they were not CSA scheduled. To
(listing the scheduling dates for para-fluorofentanyl, acetyl-alphamethylfentanyl, alpha-methylthiofentanyl, 3-methylthiofentanyl, and other
fentanyl analogs).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Way, No. 14-CR-00101, 2018 WL 2229272, at *7 (E.D.
Cal. May 16, 2018) (“[T]he bill was meant to address ‘the time lag between the
production of these new designer drugs and their subsequent control under the
Controlled Substances Act.’ ” (quoting 131 CONG. REC. 18938 (1985) (statement of
Rep. Dan Lungren))), aff’d, No. 18-10427, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 5512 (9th Cir.
Feb. 21, 2020).
65. The Countdown: Fentanyl Analogues & the Expiring Emergency Scheduling Order: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 5 (2019) [hereinafter The Countdown] (statement of Amanda Liskamm, Director, Opioid
Enforcement and Prevention Efforts, Office of the Deputy Att’y Gen. & Greg
Cherundolo, Chief of Operations, Office of Global Enforcement, Drug Enforcement Administration).
66. See Asa Louis et al., XLR-11 and UR-144 in Washington State and State of
Alaska Driving Cases, 38 J. ANALYTICAL TOXICOLOGY 563 (2014).
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protect against § 813’s human consumption requirement, sellers typically marketed synthetic cannabis as incense or potpourri in containers labeled “not for human consumption.” Synthetic cannabis
attracted consumers because of its availability, ability to evade drug
tests, and modest cost (typically between twenty-five cents and ten
dollars per gram).67 By 2012, the synthetic cannabis industry was
worth an estimated five billion dollars, with the drug trailing only real
cannabis in popularity.68
Often sold in the same retail outlets as synthetic cannabis, bath
salts gained widespread popularity in the United States as a “legal
high” starting around 2009.69 They were typically labeled as plant
food or bath salts with a prominent warning that they were not for
human consumption.70 In reality, the package typically contained a
few doses of synthetic cathinones or mephedrone, another chemical
similar in structure and effects to MDMA or amphetamine.71 Despite
their similarities to schedule I substances, most synthetic cathinones
were not then expressly illegal under the CSA and could be purchased
legally for a few thousand dollars per kilogram. That kilogram of synthetic cathinones would then be packaged and sold at a nominal price,
sometimes as little as five dollars per dose.72 Bath salts reached an
incredible level of international popularity. At the peak of their popularity, twenty percent of college and high school students in the
United Kingdom had sampled mephedrone, and over half of all pills
sold as MDMA were, in fact, mephedrone.73 Bath salts also eclipsed
more familiar narcotics in popularity among American high
schoolers.74
Congress designed the Analog Act to prevent these kinds of controlled substance analogs from growing into nationally available products. It did not. The bath salts and synthetic cannabis outbreaks
67. See, e.g., Tina Reed, K2: Easily Accessible Substance that Mimics Marijuana—
and Is Legal—Sold in Ann Arbor, ANN ARBOR NEWS (Feb. 24, 2010, 6:02 AM),
http://www.annarbor.com/news/easily-accessible-substance-that-mimics-marijuana—-and-is-legal—-sold-locally/ [https://perma.cc/U4LW-6HU3].
68. See Max Spaderna et al., Spicing Things Up: Synthetic Cannabinoids, 228
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 525, 526 (2013).
69. See Jane M. Prosser & Lewis S. Nelson, The Toxicology of Bath Salts: A Review of
Synthetic Cathinones, 8 J. MED. TOXICOLOGY 33, 33 (2012) (providing a brief history of bath salts).
70. See id.
71. See Anita Slomski, A Trip on “Bath Salts” Is Cheaper than Meth or Cocaine but
Much More Dangerous, 308 JAMA 2445, 2446 (2012) (reporting that one package
of bath salts was found to contain a synthetic cannabinoid and caffeine; another
was entirely composed of lidocaine).
72. See id. at 2445.
73. See Prosser & Nelson, supra note 69, at 35.
74. See generally Joseph J. Palamar, “Bath Salt” Use Among a Nationally Representative Sample of High School Seniors in the United States, 24 AM. J. ADDICTIONS
488 (2015).
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ended only after the scheduling of synthetic cathinones and cannabinoids. Despite the massive national consumption of the drugs and a
large number of potential defendants, Analog Act prosecutions proved
so difficult and time-consuming as to make them vanishingly rare:
Westlaw reports that just over 200 federal cases have cited § 813 of
the Analog Act since 2009.75 While this is a sizable uptick in prosecutions—federal courts have cited § 813 only 280 times in total—by
point of comparison, approximately 54,000 different federal decisions
cited the CSA during the same time period.76
IV. SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR
No one can agree on the substances that the Analog Act controls.
Under § 802(32) of the Analog Act, virtually every prosecution must
prove that the alleged analog possesses substantially similar effects
and structure to a schedule I substance.77 Neither term has an objective scientific or technical meaning, so a jury may deem any substance
a controlled substance analog.78 Even DEA scientists routinely disagree over whether a substance bears the required structural
similarity.
One of the earliest critics of the Analog Act, DEA consulting scientist Alexander Shulgin, publicly decried the substantial similarity requirement as “hopelessly vague” for having no scientific definition or
meaning.79 Shulgin spoke with special authority on controlled substance analogs: not only had he authored a popular law enforcement
textbook on controlled substances and received multiple awards from

75. This information is current as of August 27, 2021. To find these cases in a legal
research database, search cases for the citing reference “21 U.S.C. 813,” filter for
federal jurisdiction, and limit the results to those dated after January 1, 2009.
76. This information is current as of August 27, 2021. To find these cases in a legal
research database, search cases for the citing reference “21 U.S.C. 841,” filter for
federal jurisdiction, and limit the results to those dated after January 1, 2009.
77. The exceptions are the relatively rare prosecutions under § 802(32)(iii), which
only require proof that a defendant represented a substance as having effects
that are substantially similar to those of a schedule I substance.
78. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 20, at 227.
79. Alexander T. Shulgin, How Similar Is Substantially Similar?, 35 J. FORENSIC
SCI. 8 (1990), http://www.thevespiary.org/rhodium/Rhodium/chemistry/
shulgin.substantially.similar.html [https://perma.cc/7QP7-WPCG] (“There is no
‘right’ answer [to substantial similarity]. There can never be one.”). Shulgin even
describes the Act as a net which has a “completely variable mesh size” that permits law enforcement to “catch whatever fish one wishes to and let escape another fish that is not wanted.” Id.
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the DEA80 but he had also personally discovered many of the analogs
later prosecuted under the Act.81
Chemical structures possess many different features. Just as numerous qualities compose a person’s appearance—height and weight;
eye, hair, and skin color; and age, for example—chemicals similarly
possess a vast number of distinct properties. These structural properties include chemical formula, atomic weight, shape (whether in two
or three dimensions), “atomic angles, resonance, spin, bond type, and
bond strength,” functional groups, and many more.82 Weighing substantially similar effects poses a comparably difficult problem. While
the terms “stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect” are understandable, how to compare the effects of two substances remains unclear. No objective scale exists to judge the degree of similarity
between, for example, hallucinations induced by ethanol alcohol withdrawal and those of LSD.83
Compounding the difficulty of these inquiries is the fact that
schedules I and II contain hundreds of substances that induce all
manners of psychological and physiological effects. Some substances
are common—cannabis, quaaludes, fentanyls, cathinones, and
tryptamines—while others are so exotic as to be virtually unknown:
propiram, Tilidine, drotebanol, CP-47, 1-[1-(2thienyl)cyclohexyl]pyrrolidine, and many more. The schedules have
even included substances antithetical in effect to recreational drug
use, such as naloxone, the opioid agonist now commonly administered
as a fentanyl overdose antidote.84
A.

No Coherent Test Exists for Determining Substantial
Similarity

The majority of courts have consistently agreed that “substantially
similar” lacks any coherent scientific meaning or concrete definition,
with some judges going so far as to opine that Congress intended for
the words to be given “their ordinary meanings.”85 Despite acknowl80. See generally Drake Bennett, Dr. Ecstasy, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 30, 2005),
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/30/magazine/dr-ecstasy.html [https://perma.cc/
2STU-JJXH].
81. See generally ALEXANDER SHULGIN & ANN SHULGIN, TIHKAL: THE CONTINUATION
(1997), https://erowid.org/library/books_online/tihkal/tihkal.shtml [https://
perma.cc/3Z4R-GVYU].
82. Paul Anacker & Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Confusing World of the Controlled
Substance Analogue (CSA) Criminal Defense, 42 CRIM. L. BULL. 744, 770 (2006).
83. See Bell, supra note 20, at 229.
84. See DEA ORANGE BOOK, supra note 51, at 11.
85. United States v. Lawton, 84 F. Supp. 3d 331, 337 (D. Vt. 2015) (“[T]here is no
indication that Congress intended the words ‘substantially similar’ to have a specialized or scientific meaning. Therefore, these words should be given their ordinary meanings.” (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Reece, No. CRIM.
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edging the lack of an agreed-upon scientific definition, almost all
courts have found the statute permissibly definite to survive a voidfor-vagueness challenge.
Parties rely chiefly upon expert witness testimony to define substantial similarity, and the jury is left to weigh the “relative strengths
and merits of the methodologies supporting the experts’ opinions.”86
But because no common scientific framework exists for analyzing substantially similar effects or structure, expert testimony often
“amount[s] to little more than the deduction of a working hypothesis
supported by a general knowledge of chemistry and biochemistry.”87
As one DEA expert witness very candidly explained, “ ‘Substantial
similarity’ is a gut-level decision. . . . And all ‘gut feelings’ are legitimate.”88 Courts have agreed that “such a comparison defies quantification” and effectively hinges on an individual chemist’s intuition.89
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 permits expert witness testimony
when the expert’s scientific knowledge will aid in determining a fact at
issue, but Professor Edward Imwinkelried and Paul Anacker have
voiced grave doubts regarding the propriety of allowing expert witness
testimony to address the non-technical question of substantial
similarity:
“[S]ubstantial similarity” is not a scientific concept. To convert the notion into
a scientific concept, a researcher would have to specify objective criteria for
substantial similarity. Without the benefit of such criteria, the analyst must
necessarily rely on subjective judgment, and his or her final conclusion as to
similarity remains impressionistic. Until testable criteria are defined, the hypothesis fails [the] threshold criterion for reliable “scientific . . . knowledge”:
There is no way to test the proposition empirically.90

Despite the strength of this critique, defendants’ challenges to the admissibility of expert witness testimony for the prosecution have
proven unsuccessful, although the judicial justifications for denying
these challenges fall short of persuasive.91

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

12-00146, 2013 WL 3865067, at *9 (W.D. La. July 24, 2013))); see also United
States v. Brown, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1245 (S.D. Ala. 2003) (“[There is] no hardline definition of the term . . . the definition of ‘similar chemical structure’ depends on the judgment of a chemist.”), aff’d, 415 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2005).
United States v. Cooper, No. 14-CR-014-J-20MCR, 2015 WL 13850123, at *5
(M.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 2015) (quoting United States v. Fedida, 942 F. Supp. 2d 1270,
1279 n.6 (M.D. Fla. 2013)).
Fedida, 942 F. Supp. 2d at 1281; see also Jeffrey C. Grass, McFadden v. United
States: Deconstructing Synthetic Drug Prosecutions, CHAMPION, May 2015, at 34
(discussing expert witness issues related to the substantially similar standard).
Brown, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1245. The expert witness’s gut feelings were enough to
support a conviction. Id.
Id.
Anacker & Imwinkelried, supra note 82, at 768.
See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 415 F.3d 1257, 1266–69 (11th Cir. 2005);
Cooper, 2015 WL 13850123, at *9.
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No uniform legal tests guide the substantial similarity analysis.
Scholarly literature describes structural similarity tests using phrases
such as “core arrangement of atoms,” “structure and effects,” or “visual inspection.”92 Yet an examination of the cited appellate cases finds
no judicially designed tests to guide future prosecutions; instead,
there are only affirmations of a particular prosecution’s means of
proof. For example, United States v. Klecker93 has been cited as the
originating case for the “core arrangement of atoms” test.94 In that
case, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that 5methoxy-N,N-diisopropyltryptamine (Foxy) was a controlled substance analog of the schedule I substance DET.95 The district court
based its finding on a number of facts, including that Foxy and DET
share a “core arrangement of atoms” and both possess a “tryptamine
core.”96 Klecker never referred to or adopted the “core arrangement of
atoms” as a legal test.97
Similarly, the “structure and effect” test is described as a means of
determining substantial similarity by examining a drug’s chemical
composition in tandem with its effects on users.98 Left unexplained is
how this test imposes different requirements than those imposed by a
conjunctive reading of § 802(32)(A). Finally, the “visual inspection”
test describes the same process discussed above in which the jury is
presented with comparative visual representations of a controlled substance and its alleged analog.99
92. Jeremy Mandell, Note, Tripping Over Legal Highs: Why the Controlled Substances Analogue Enforcement Act Is Ineffective Against Designer Drugs, 2017 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1299, 1315; see also Brief of the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4–5, McFadden v.
United States, 576 U.S. 186 (2015) (No. 14–378) (explaining the different tests
applied by the circuit courts of appeals).
93. 348 F.3d 69 (4th Cir. 2003).
94. See Mandell, supra note 92, at 1315.
95. Klecker, 348 F.3d at 72.
96. Id. at 73 (quoting United States v. Klecker, 228 F. Supp. 2d 720, 728 (E.D. Va.
2002)). LSD, psilocybin, and a host of other psychedelics all share a common
tryptamine structure. See Bill Sanders et al., “Research Chemicals”: Tryptamine
and Phenethylamine Use Among High-Risk Youth, 43 SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE
389, 392 (2008).
97. See Klecker, 348 F.3d at 73. A narrow reading of Klecker, in which the court’s
reasoning only encompasses drugs sharing a “tryptamine core,” would yield unacceptable results by criminalizing common substances. Melatonin and 5-HTP, two
over-the-counter sleep aids, also possess a tryptamine core. See Ricardo LetraVilela et al., Distinct Roles of N-Acetyl and 5-Methoxy Groups in the Antiproliferative and Neuroprotective Effects of Melatonin, 434 MOLECULAR & CELLULAR ENDOCRINOLOGY 238, 242 (2016) (noting melatonin’s tryptamine core).
98. See, e.g., Kathryn E. Brown, Comment, Stranger Than Fiction: Modern Designer
Drugs and the Federal Controlled Substances Analogue Act, 47 ARIZ. STATE L.J.
449, 461–62 (2015).
99. See Mandell, supra note 92, at 1315.
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Most questions of substantial structural similarity ultimately
hinge upon a comparison of two-dimensional “stick and letter” diagrams.100 These uninformative diagrams only illustrate a substance’s
atomic composition and location and omit all other relevant characteristics, leading the entire process to be dubbed “guilt by Rorschach
test.”101 Bereft of any objective, scientific guideposts to control the
structural similarity analysis, experts point to a seemingly endless
number of chemical properties in support of their intuitions, a practice
sanctioned by the courts.102
United States v. Roberts illustrates the sheer cacophony of contradictory scientific evidence that a judge or jury must weigh in a typical
analog prosecution. In Roberts, the defendants had been indicted for
selling 1,4-butanediol—an industrial solvent and alleged analog of the
schedule I “date rape” drug GHB—to bodybuilders as a health supplement.103 At a hearing challenging the Analog Act as unconstitutionally vague, three testifying experts compared the two chemicals based
on the following criteria: (1) functional groups and the functional
groups’ properties; (2) whether the chemicals would be grouped together in an organic chemistry textbook; (3) two-dimensional charts,
three-dimensional appearance, and the differences between the two;
(4) results from a nuclear magnetic resonance spectrometer; (5) postingestion structure; (6) molecular linearity, stability, and charges; and
(7) “atomic composition . . . as illustrated in their molecular
chains.”104 The prosecution’s expert, a DEA employee, concluded that
the chemicals were substantially similar in structure.105 The defendant’s witnesses, both college professors, came to the opposite conclusion, going so far as to claim that “a student who stated on a college
exam that GHB and 1,4-butanediol were similar in chemical structure
would indeed fail such an exam.”106
The district court ruled for the defendant, but the Second Circuit
reversed on appeal. Judge Guido Calabresi found that 1,4-butanediol
was substantially structurally similar to GHB because the chemicals
differed by only two atoms and because 1,4-butanediol transformed
into GHB upon ingestion.107 Citing these two chemical features, the
100. See, e.g., United States v. Fedida, 942 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1279 (M.D. Fla. 2013).
101. Bell, supra note 20, at 228.
102. See Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 3–8, McFadden v. United States, 576 U.S. 186
(2015) (No. 14–378). One exception was the rejection of a plant pathologist’s testimony using the Tanimoto coefficient to measure chemical similarities. See United
States v. Brown, 415 F.3d 1257, 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 2005).
103. United States v. Roberts, No. 01 CR 410, 2002 WL 31014834, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 9, 2002), vacated, 363 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2004).
104. Id. at *1–2, *4.
105. Id. at *1.
106. Id. at *2.
107. Roberts, 363 F.3d at 125.
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court disregarded the disagreement of the expert scientists, deciding
that the Analog Act was sufficiently definite in regard to 1,4butanediol.108
Recent Analog Act prosecutions have continued to acknowledge
and dismiss the paradox of having expert scientific witnesses testify
on a concept lacking any agreed-upon objective parameters. The typical justification for introducing conflicting or impenetrable expert testimony is to focus the inquiry only on whether a lay jury can use the
evidence to reach a verdict.109
In United States v. Fedida, the court addressed whether the statutory definition of controlled substance analog permitted “ordinary people” to determine that synthetic cannabinoids UR-144 and XLR-11
were substantially similar in structure to the schedule I substance
JWH-18.110 The court surveyed the esoteric chemical evidence
presented by the parties, including the “substitution of a tetramethylcyclopropyl moiety in place of the naphthyl moiety,” the delocalized electrons in aromatic rings and their shapes, and most
critical to the court’s analysis, a “replacement found within the 3-position substituent.”111 While recognizing the legitimate disputes between experts, the court decided that “the Government need not
overcome the critical eye of chemists and other experts. Rather, it
must merely show that ordinary people would be able to determine
whether UR-144 and XLR-11 are proscribed analogues of JWH-18.”112
The court ultimately found that the Analog Act was not unconstitutionally vague as applied because “[a] reasonable layperson who examines the two-dimensional drawings of the chemical
structures . . . could plausibly conclude that such substances are substantially similar. This is all that is required.”113
A lay jury can always reach a conclusion, no matter the volume of
conflicting and arcane expert opinions. But this is not what the Due
Process Clause requires. The Due Process Clause requires “that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited”114 before a
jury’s verdict. The Analog Act does not provide that notice.

108. Id. at 127.
109. See, e.g., United States v. Way, 804 F. App’x 504, 509 (9th Cir. 2020) (“The district court ruled that since the jury would decide what was a controlled substance
analogue, any internal DEA disagreement as to whether 5-F-UR-144 was an analogue was irrelevant. We agree with the district court.”).
110. United States v. Fedida, 942 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1274 (M.D. Fla. 2013).
111. Id. at 1279.
112. Id. (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
113. Id.
114. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
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No Coherent Test Exists for Determining Substantially
Similar Effects

Like substantially similar structure, no definite criteria or test
governs the question of whether a substance “has a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system that is
substantially similar to . . . a controlled substance in schedule I or
II.”115
Without an objective standard for determining the substantial similarity of effects, “it is far from clear that any available evidence on
this issue would satisfy either of the major admissibility tests” for expert witness testimony.116 Nonetheless, courts have been very permissive in allowing a wide range of evidence, including “anecdotal reports,
affidavits and testimonials” from substance users as well as scientific
studies.117 Section 802(32)(A)(ii) states that the substance has an effect on the “central nervous system,” but it does not specify that it
must affect a human’s central nervous system; experiments on animals (even toads, as one DEA expert opined118) are sufficient.119
Prosecutors have also employed studies measuring a substance’s
effect on particular nervous system receptor sites. However, these
studies typically only report whether a substance acted on a given receptor site. In United States v. Cooper, the DEA concluded that 5F-PB22 has substantially similar effects to the schedule I drug AM-2201
because both drugs act as agonists on the CB1 receptor, similar to marijuana.120 Yet receptor site activity alone provides the illusion of scientific certainty with very little real information about a drug’s
effects. Other drugs affecting CB1 receptors include the antibiotic Minocycline121 and the over-the-counter painkiller Tylenol.122
115. 21 U.S.C. § 802(32)(A)(ii).
116. Anacker & Imwinkelried, supra note 82, at 772.
117. United States v. Klecker, 228 F. Supp. 2d 720, 729 (E.D. Va. 2002), aff’d, 348 F.3d
69 (4th Cir. 2003).
118. See Bell, supra note 20, at 232 n.27 (citing United States v. Picanso, No. 1440005-DDC (D. Kan. Feb. 3, 2017)). An analog’s effect on rats is also permissible
evidence. See United States v. Nasir, No. 12-CR-102, 2013 WL 5373619, at *3
(E.D. Ky. Sept. 25, 2013).
119. See generally United States v. Way, No. 14-CR-00101-BAM, 2018 WL 5310773, at
*4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2018) (“[S]everal district courts have found that expert testimony based on animal studies is sufficiently reliable in Analogue Act prosecutions to demonstrate a substance’s pharmacological effect on the human central
nervous system.” (citing United States v. Williams, No. 13-00236-01, 2017 WL
1856081, at *16 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 7, 2017))); United States v. Reulet, No. 14-40005,
2015 WL 7776876, at *11 (D. Kan. Dec. 2, 2015); United States v. Bays, No. 13CR-0357-B, 2014 WL 3764876, at *14 (N.D. Tex. July 31, 2014).
120. See Motion to Dismiss Indictment and Memorandum of Law at 26, United States
v. Cooper, No. 14-CR-014-J-20MCR (M.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 2015).
121. See Leonardo Guasti et al., Minocycline Treatment Inhibits Microglial Activation
and Alters Spinal Levels of Endocannabinoids in a Rat Model of Neuropathic
Pain, 5 MOLECULAR PAIN 35 (2009).
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More confounding is the fact that courts have permitted prosecutions to proceed even if the government admits to having no concrete
evidence regarding a substance’s effect. In Fedida, after hearing the
government’s expert testimony on the effects of UR-144 and XLR-11,
the court pointedly noted that the basis of this testimony had “not
been subjected to peer review or publication. There was no evidence
concerning the known or potential error rates of the experts’ methodology.”123 And it remained unclear “whether the experts’ opinions and
methodologies were generally accepted in the scientific community.”124 One expert even “conceded that there is an insufficient basis
for her to form an opinion about the pharmacologic effects” of the alleged analogs.125 However, the court permitted the prosecution to proceed based on the government’s assurances that “it is conducting tests
which could support its experts’ opinions.”126
C.

“Hybrid” Substantial Similarity

Further complicating the possibility of actual notice of analog illegality, the hybrid substantial similarity approach permits a substance
to be considered a controlled analog if it is substantially structurally
similar to one chemical yet similar in effects to an entirely different
chemical.
In United States v. Demott, two defendants had been convicted of
importing from China the unscheduled chemicals 4-methylmethcathinone (4-MMC or “mephedrone”) and 4-methyl-n-ethylcathinone (4MEC) and selling them as MDMA substitutes.127 At trial, the government relied on expert testimony stating that both chemicals bore substantial structural similarities to methcathinone, which is listed on
schedule I, and induced effects substantially similar to those of a different listed substance, MDMA.128 The defendants contended that an
analog must be substantially similar in effect and structure to the
same scheduled narcotic. The court rejected the defendants’ argument
after finding no statutory requirement that an alleged analog be substantially similar in structure and effect to the same scheduled
substance.129
122. See generally Pascal P. Klinger-Gratz et al., Acetaminophen Relieves Inflammatory Pain Through CB1 Cannabinoid Receptors in the Rostral Ventromedial
Medulla, 38 J. NEUROSCIENCE 322 (2018).
123. United States v. Fedida, 942 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1281 (M.D. Fla. 2013).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1281 n.7.
126. Id. at 1282.
127. United States v. Demott, 906 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2018).
128. Id. at 238.
129. Id. at 239 (“Nothing in the language of the Act suggests that the drug listed in
Schedule I or II that is substantially similar in chemical structure to the ana-
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Substantially Similar Punishment

Finally, no one knows what punishment an Analog Act conviction
will merit. The federal sentencing guidelines dictate punishments
based on the kind of substance involved in a conviction but do not list
punishments for every conceivable analog. “In the case of a controlled
substance that is not specifically referenced in [the] guideline,” such
as a controlled substance analog, judges must “determine the base offense level using the converted drug weight of the most closely related
controlled substance referenced in [the] guideline.”130 Making this determination requires the judge to conduct yet another substantial similarity-in-structure-and-effects inquiry nearly identical to those
performed at trial.
The judge’s conclusion can be the difference between a few months
or a few decades in prison.131 In United States v. Moreno, the defendant, convicted for distributing alpha-PVP, contested the sentencing
calculation, arguing that alpha-PVP should be considered an analog of
a schedule V drug, pyrovalerone, instead of the schedule I methcathinone.132 Using pyrovalerone as the reference drug would have yielded
a sentence measured in months; however, the judge found methcathinone to be the closest correlating substance and sentenced the defendant to years in prison.133
This level of sentencing indeterminacy may satisfy due process for
a typical CSA conviction in which a defendant knew the substance’s
legal status in advance. But the Analog Act’s initial substantial similarity determination leaves defendants incapable of knowing whether
a substance is illicit and, if it is, the sentencing guideline’s substantial
similarity inquiry makes it impossible to determine the severity of the
punishment defendants may incur.
E.

The Impossibility of Actual Notice

Courts have assumed that a defendant can conform their behavior
to the law by seeking expert advice.134 They cannot. The lack of an

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

logue must be the same listed drug that is substantially similar to the analogue
in pharmacological effect.” (citation omitted)).
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 cmt. 5 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2021).
See Sarah Nishioka, Comment, The “Grande Iced Nonfat Chai with a Shot of
Espresso” Problem: Dealing with Designer Drugs in the Wake of McFadden v.
United States, 39 U. HAW. L. REV. 265, 287 (2016).
United States v. Moreno, 870 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2017).
Id.
See, e.g., United States v. Niemoeller, No. IP 02-09-CR-1, 2003 WL 1563863, at *4
(S.D. Ind. Jan. 24, 2003) (“[W]hen dealing with the distribution of organic chemical compounds for human consumption and with intended or hoped-for central
nervous system effects, Congress could reasonably expect and require persons
engaged in that activity to possess or obtain the specialized knowledge needed to
conform their conduct to law.”).
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objective similarity standard renders expert advice meaningless. The
government has secured Analog Act convictions against retailers who
voluntarily submitted to preemptive DEA inspections135 or who consulted law enforcement136 or former DEA scientists.137 Expert biochemists have even manufactured these substances, mistakenly
believing them to be legal.138 One defendant, Asim Malik, owned a gas
station in central Kentucky and sold synthetic cannabis as a side business.139 Conscious of a possible legal hazard, he “undertook extraordinary efforts to ensure that he was operating within the bounds of the
law.”140 In 2010, Malik “took a sample of the materials to the Nicholasville Police Department’s Drug Enforcement Division. He was told
that at that time . . . the substances were legal.”141 In 2011, law enforcement seized some of his synthetic cannabis only to return it after
deeming it legal.142 Malik had each product tested at a laboratory to
ensure that he did not sell any illegal substances. Even Malik’s lawyer
told him that his products were legal. Despite his efforts, Malik was
ultimately convicted under the Analog Act and sentenced to fifty
months in federal prison.143
As a practical matter, assessing an analog’s legality would be extremely difficult. The first step would be to locate suitable experts on
chemical structure and the pharmacology of exotic psychoactive substances. The experts would then sift through the structure and effects
of hundreds of controlled schedule I and schedule II drugs in search of
similar-seeming chemicals, looking at effects and structure separately.144 Finally, the experts would analyze the candidate substance
using all of the substantial similarity criteria employed in all prior
Analog Act cases. Yet even these extreme precautions would afford a
defendant no safety: ultimately, a controlled substance analog is
135. See Jordan S. Rubin, Fear and Loathing—and Gorsuch!—in Synthetic Drug
Fight, BLOOMBERG L. (July 12, 2018, 11:32 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/
white-collar-and-criminal-law/fear-and-loathingand-gorsuch-in-synthetic-drugfight [https://perma.cc/7WWR-UKX6].
136. See United States v. Makkar, 810 F.3d 1139, 1147 (10th Cir. 2015). At trial Makkar and his employee sought to introduce evidence “that they asked state law
enforcement agents to test the incense to assure its legality under state law—and
that they offered to stop selling the incense until the results came in.” That evidence was excluded. Id.
137. See Rubin, supra note 135.
138. See Brown, supra note 98, at 457–58.
139. See United States v. Nasir, No. 12-CR-102, 2013 WL 5373625 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 25,
2013).
140. Id. at *4 (citation omitted).
141. Id. (citation omitted).
142. See id. (citation omitted).
143. United States v. Nasir, No. 12-CR-102, 2013 WL 6925061 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 17,
2013).
144. See generally United States v. Demott, 906 F.3d 231, 239 (2d Cir. 2018); Bell,
supra note 20, at 228 n.31.
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whatever a jury says it is, and there is no reliable avenue for gaining
advance notice of what a jury might think.
F.

Failed Attempts at Actual Notice

The Analog Act’s animating purpose is to provide a flexible
prosecutorial tool for combating novel substances of abuse, a goal that
supposedly requires the DEA to withhold from the public a list of
chemicals considered to be controlled substance analogs. Yet reporters
recently discovered the existence of a DEA master list of controlled
substance analogs.145
If the Analog Act was properly relied upon as merely a stopgap
measure to criminalize dangerous substances until the completion of
administrative scheduling, no secret DEA analog list would exist. Instead, the DEA would initiate formal rulemaking immediately or soon
after an analog’s discovery, thereby permitting citizens to learn
whether a substance might be prosecuted as an analog by consulting
the Code of Federal Regulations.
As of very recently, the DEA claims to issue advisory letters to “anyone who calls or inquires about a substance as [to] its potential status as an analogue,” assuring that “one only needs to go on [the] DEA’s
website for that contact information.”146 The advisory letters themselves do not conclusively classify a substance but only offer an opinion on whether a substance “may” be treated as an analog.147 Advice
from the DEA would prove valuable for preventing certain good-faith
Analog Act violations—people like Mr. Makkar and Mr. Malik could
now consult federal authorities instead of relying on the limited expertise of local law enforcement. Yet this practice seems unlikely to save
the statute from a vagueness challenge. The statute itself does not direct citizens to seek the DEA’s advice, nor do traditional notions of due
process require citizens to first seek out a clarifying opinion from law
enforcement.
145. See Jordan S. Rubin, America’s Secret Drug War Part One: The Psychedelic
Shack, BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 1, 2019, 12:01 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/
featured/americas-secret-drug-war/part1 [https://perma.cc/2KY9-VSHZ].
146. Government’s Opposition in Response to Defendant’s Motion to Limit Testimony
of Dr. Jordan Trecki at 13, United States v. Ritchie, No. 15-CR-00285 (D. Nev.
Dec. 13, 2018), ECF No. 272; see also Jordan S. Rubin, Calling the Designer Drug
‘Hotline’—Is This Stuff Legal or Not?, BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 20, 2019, 11:23 AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/white-collar-and-criminal-law/calling-the-designer-drug-hotline-is-this-stuff-legal-or-not [https://perma.cc/6Z9P-BGAE] (explaining the process of contacting the DEA for information on compliance with
the law).
147. See Letter from Terrence L. Boos, Chief, Drug & Chem. Evaluation Section, to
Jordan Rubin, Bloomberg BNA (May 20, 2019), https://src.bna.com/KfF?_
ga=2.123479115.1927138745.1574094489-802168933.1574094489 [https://
perma.cc/ZTQ8-C23R].
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Further devaluing these advisory letters’ utility is the reality that
the DEA’s opinion on analog status can change rapidly and without
warning. In United States v. Cooper, the defendant was indicted for
selling 5F-PB-22.148 At the time of the defendant’s arrest, the DEA
had not yet issued an internal declaration that 5F-PB-22 was a controlled substance analog of AM-2201.149 In fact, “the DEA only issued
an opinion as to the two substances’ similarity after Cooper had been
arrested.”150 The defendant challenged his prosecution under the Ex
Post Facto Clause, arguing that he was being prosecuted for what had
been legal behavior at the time. The court ruled in favor of the prosecution, finding that, under the statute, 5F-PB-22 had always been a
controlled substance analog of AM-2201, even before the DEA added
the chemical to its private list of controlled substance analogs.151
G.

Schrödinger Legality

No one can have actual notice of what the Analog Act prohibits
because the statute does not categorically criminalize substances. Instead, all substances exist in a state of legal superposition as neither
legal nor illegal until a jury reaches its verdict. As recognized by the
Seventh Circuit in United States v. Turcotte, “A substance’s legal status as a controlled substance analogue is not a fact that a defendant
can know conclusively ex ante; it is a fact that the jury must find at
trial.”152 Thus, a substance’s “analogue status exists for just the single
instance” of any particular prosecution.153 If a different defendant
were to be tried again for the exact same substance, “the arguments
all start over again,” and a new jury must again perform the exact
same inquiry.154
148. United States v. Cooper, No. 14-CR-014-J-20MCR, 2015 WL 13850123, at *1
(M.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 2015).
149. Id. at *4.
150. Id.
151. Id. at *7.
152. United States v. Turcotte, 405 F.3d 515, 526 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Kau, supra
note 39, at 1105–06 (recognizing the impossibility of advance knowledge of analog
status); Dangerous Synthetic Drugs: Hearing Before the S. Caucus on Int’l Narcotics Control, 113th Cong. 3 (2013) (statement of Joseph T. Rannazzisi, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Diversion Control, DEA) (“Criminal liability
depends upon a finding, in each particular prosecution, that the substance is a
‘controlled substance analogue’ and that the substance was intended for human
consumption.”).
153. ALEXANDER SHULGIN & ANN SHULGIN, #11. a-ET, in TIHKAL: THE CONTINUATION
(1997), https://erowid.org/library/books_online/tihkal/tihkal11.shtml [https://
perma.cc/UQ7D-6LR2].
154. Id. Res judicata does not prevent the government from indicting a third party for
the possession or sale of a chemical previously found by a jury to not be a controlled substance analog. See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 132 (1979).
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In McFadden, the Supreme Court assumed that “past arrests” for a
particular analog would “put a defendant on notice of the controlled
status of a substance.”155 In practice, this assumption does not stand.
As the Department of Justice acknowledged to the Senate, “Because a
factual finding that a substance is an analogue of a controlled substance in a particular case has no precedential impact, each case can
lead to disparate results.”156 This legal superposition poses grave
complications for fair notice because a substance’s temporary analog
status means that, like the observer of Schrödinger’s cat,157 a defendant cannot know a substance’s legal status in advance of a verdict.
A substance’s legal superposition also poses a grave threat of arbitrary enforcement by permitting fact finders to reach opposite legal
conclusions on the same substance. Criminal law typically treats identical acts differently depending on a defendant’s state of mind.158 For
example, there is a clear difference between accidentally spilling rat
poison in a tea kettle and intentionally poisoning a victim. Criminal
law also distinguishes identical acts executed with identical states of
mind that yield different outcomes. The tea kettle poisoner would receive a very different sentence if their victim died rather than merely
fell ill.159 But few, if any, statutes other than the Analog Act permit
different legal outcomes for identical acts committed with identical
states of mind that yield identical results.
Analog Act prosecutions concerning identical chemicals regularly
reach different outcomes. For example, in United States v. Washam, a
jury found that 1,4-butanediol was an analog of GHB.160 Around the
same time, the jury in United States v. Turcotte found that 1,4butanediol—the exact same substance—was not an analog of GHB.161
155. United States v. Demott, 906 F.3d 231, 242 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting McFadden v.
United States, 576 U.S. 186, 192 n.1 (2015)).
156. The Countdown, supra note 65, at 5.
157. In physicist Erwin Schrödinger’s famous “Schrödinger’s cat” thought experiment,
a cat is held for an hour in a closed chamber along with a bottle of poison. Attached to the bottle of poison is a mechanism that will either randomly shatter
the vial, releasing the poison and killing the cat, or do nothing. To an outside
observer, the cat exists in a superposition of states—it is either alive or dead—
until the hour is up, the chamber opens, and the cat is observed. Until that moment, the observer cannot definitively know which state the cat occupies.
158. See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Parker, The Economics of Mens Rea, 79 VA. L. REV. 741, 777
(1993) (“[A]s is observed in virtually all criminal law systems, externally identical
events of the most serious nature, including killings and sexual assaults, are
treated much differently depending upon the actor’s state of mind.”).
159. See Darryl K. Brown, Federal Mens Rea Interpretation and the Limits of Culpability’s Relevance, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 129 (2012) (“These [criminal]
offenses impose different degrees of liability on offenders whose conduct, intentions, and awareness are the same, depending on whether their identical actions
caused a death, merely injured, or caused no injury at all.” (footnote omitted)).
160. United States v. Washam, 312 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 2002).
161. United States v. Turcotte, 405 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 2005).
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Similarly, two federal courts have reached opposite conclusions regarding the same synthetic cannabinoids. In Smoke Shop, LLC v.
United States, a small Wisconsin store owner petitioned for the return
of $100,000 in seized synthetic cannabis containing the chemicals UR144 and XLR-11.162 The store owner had initially agreed to the
seizure, believing that the cannabis would be returned, but the DEA
refused to return it, claiming that UR-144 and XLR-11 were controlled
substance analogs of JWH-018.163 After hearing expert testimony, the
court agreed with the petitioner that “the overwhelming weight of
opinion in the scientific community is that the chemical structures of
UR–144 and XLR–11 are not substantially similar to the chemical
structure of JWH–018.”164 The court did not ultimately order the return of the substances—the DEA had emergency scheduled both
chemicals part way through the hearing—but noted that it had been
“unfair for a federal agency to seize the property of a small business
owner and then keep it until it is declared illegal.”165 But in United
States v. Fedida, decided just a few weeks before Smoke Shop, a Florida district court had arrived at the exact opposite conclusion, finding
that “the chemical structures of UR–144, XLR–11, and
JWH–18 . . . are substantially similar.”166
In one Analog Act case, the Second Circuit rebuffed legal superposition as a ground for voiding the statute by quoting Smith v. United
States: “[T]he possibility that different juries might reach different
conclusions as to the same material does not render the statute unconstitutional.”167 This reasoning falls flat. Conflicting legal conclusions
on a substance’s legality are the Analog Act’s reality, not a mere possibility. There can be no enforcement more arbitrary than having two
identical defendants receive different outcomes for the same behavior.
Legal superposition permits another kind of arbitrary enforcement: forcing defendants to plead guilty to distributing a legal substance. In United States v. Picanso,168 federal prosecutors ultimately
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Smoke Shop, LLC v. United States, 949 F. Supp. 2d 877, 878 (E.D. Wis. 2013).
Id.
Id. at 879.
Id.
United States v. Fedida, 942 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1279 (M.D. Fla. 2013). Compare
United States v. Way, No. 14-CR-00101-BAM-1, 2018 WL 5310773, at *2 (E.D.
Cal. Oct. 25, 2018) (“The government charged defendant with violations of the
Controlled Substances Act as to . . . AM-2201 . . . . [T]he jury at his trial did not
convict defendant based on any conduct related to the use of AM-2201 . . . .”),
aff’d, 804 F. App’x 504 (9th Cir. 2020), with United States v. Malone, 828 F.3d
331, 334 (5th Cir. 2016) (sentencing defendants to 117 months in prison for possession with intent to distribute AM-2201).
167. United States v. Ansaldi, 372 F.3d 118, 123 n.2 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Smith v.
United States, 431 U.S. 291, 309 (1977)).
168. See Bell, supra note 20, at 229; see also supra text accompanying notes 20–25
(describing the Picanso case as a hypothetical scenario to illustrate the failures of
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indicted thirteen company employees of the Outer Edge, a multi-state
synthetic cannabis manufacturer and distributor, for conspiracy to
manufacture and distribute controlled substance analogs. The Outer
Edge had gone to great lengths to ensure compliance with federal and
state law, employing researchers to keep abreast of new statutory developments and altering their product’s chemical composition as required. Its legal staff had repeatedly assured employees and
customers that all chemicals used were permitted by state and federal
law.
Facing life-altering prison sentences, five employees accepted a “no
look” plea bargain169 without ever seeing the evidence against them.
Two employees rejected all plea offers and proceeded to trial. They
faced a maximum sentence of twenty years. The defendants’ co-workers testified that the two defendants knew they were selling analogs
intended for human consumption and had consumed the analogs
themselves.170 Yet discovery uncovered a surprising revelation: even
the DEA’s scientists disagreed as to whether the analogs were sufficiently similar to controlled substances. The jury ultimately acquitted
both defendants.171 Their coworkers who pled guilty went to prison.
V. THE MISSING SCIENTER REQUIREMENT
Even when the Analog Act has attracted judicial skepticism, courts
have consistently rejected vagueness challenges by finding a scienter
requirement and sufficiently narrowing the range of criminalized conduct to squeeze the statute into due process boundaries.172
It is well established that a scienter requirement can save an otherwise vague statute from being voided. In Village of Hoffman Estates
v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., the Supreme Court found that a
scienter requirement immunized an ordinance from being voided for
lack of notice.173 At issue was an ordinance requiring a business to

169.
170.
171.
172.

173.

the Analog Act). Bell’s article provides a detailed exploration of Picanso and the
extreme injustices created by combining the Analog Act with modern plea-bargaining practices.
See United States v. Loeffler, No. 14-CR-40005 (D. Kan. Aug. 3, 2017) (judgment).
See Excerpt Transcript of Jury Trial (Testimony of Tracy Picanso) at 15–16,
United States v. Adams, No. 14-CR-40005 (D. Kan. 2017).
See Verdict Form for Terrie Adams, United States v. Adams, No. 14-CR-40005 (D.
Kan. 2017); Verdict Form for Craig Broombaugh, United States v. Broombaugh,
No. 14-CR-40005 (D. Kan. 2017).
See, e.g., United States. v. Roberts, 363 F.3d 118, 123 (2d Cir. 2004); United
States v. Hofstatter, 8 F.3d 316, 322 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Carlson, 87
F.3d 440, 444 (11th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Klecker, 348 F.3d 69, 71
(4th Cir. 2003) (“The intent requirement alone tends to defeat any vagueness
challenge based on the potential for arbitrary enforcement.”). A small number of
courts have found no scienter requirement at all. See Carlson, 87 F.3d at 443 n.3.
Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982)
(“[A] scienter requirement [in a criminal statute] may mitigate a law’s vagueness,
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obtain a license before it sold “any items, effect, paraphernalia, accessory or thing which is designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs.”174 The Court found a scienter requirement in the
ordinance, reasoning that a violation required a store to “deliberately
display[ ] its wares in a manner that appeals to or encourages illegal
drug use” and that “a retailer could scarcely ‘market’ items ‘for’ a particular use without intending that use.”175
Yet an elusive scienter requirement fails to provide meaningful restrictions on the range of behaviors that a vague statute criminalizes.
And in judging a void-for-vagueness challenge, one factor weighing
against a statute’s continued existence is if it remains the subject of a
deep and persistent circuit split even after numerous attempts at clarification.176 Despite decades of attempted clarification, no court has
successfully clarified the Analog Act’s scienter requirement. To the extent the Supreme Court’s decision in McFadden provided clarity, it did
so by sanctioning the use of almost every conceivable form of scienter
using any kind of evidence, including facts logically unconnected to a
defendant’s knowledge or intent. Such expansive scienter does not aid
in narrowing an overly vague statute.
A.

Pre-McFadden Scienter

Before McFadden, courts had reached a number of conflicting interpretations of the Analog Act’s scienter requirement. In United
States v. Desurra, the Fifth Circuit considered whether prosecutors
needed to prove that the defendants knew that MDMA (then unscheduled) was an analog of the schedule I substance MDA.177 The
Desurra court located the intent requirement in § 841, reasoning that
when “a defendant possesses an analogue, with intent to distribute or
import, the defendant need not know that the drug he possesses is an
analogue. It suffices that he know what drug he possesses, and that he
possess it with the statutorily defined bad purpose.”178
A few years later, in United States v. Hofstatter, the Sixth Circuit
reached an entirely different conclusion.179 In Hofstatter, two aspiring
black-market chemists challenged their Analog Act convictions, attacking the substantial similarity requirement as unconstitutionally

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that his conduct is proscribed.”).
Id. at 492.
Id. at 502.
See, e.g., United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 91 (1921) (observing
that the failure of “persistent efforts” to establish a standard can provide evidence of vagueness); Johnson v. United States, 575 U.S. 591, 597 (2015).
United States v. Desurra, 865 F.2d 651, 652 (5th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 653.
United States v. Hofstatter, 8 F.3d 316 (6th Cir. 1993).
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vague as applied to the intended manufacture of cathinones.180 Citing
Hoffman Estates, the Sixth Circuit rejected the challenge, finding that
§ 813’s requirement that the substance be intended for human consumption sufficiently narrows the range of criminalized conduct,
therefore preventing arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.181
These differences in Analog Act application continued to grow for
decades, with courts employing an increasing number and variety of
overlapping or contradictory scienter requirements. Although the circuit split has been characterized as a two-way split and elsewhere as a
three-way split,182 either description understates the total lack of circuit uniformity. Closer examination reveals at least seven different
pre-McFadden approaches to Analog Act scienter: (1) knowledge that
an analog satisfies both substantial similarity requirements;183 (2)
knowledge of an analog’s substantially similar effects, from which the
court imputes the defendant’s knowledge of substantially similar
structure (called the Turcotte inference);184 (3) knowledge that an analog is a controlled substance under § 841;185 (4) knowledge that an
analog is intended for human consumption;186 (5) some combination
or modification of the preceding standards,187 such as knowing a
drug’s identity and “posess[ing] it with the statutorily defined bad
purpose;”188 (6) that there is no scienter requirement;189 and (7) that
180. Id. at 319.
181. Id. at 322 (citing Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S.
489, 498 (1982)).
182. Compare Grass, supra note 87, at 37 (dividing circuits into two main groups regarding scienter requirements) and Nishioka, supra note 131, at 287 (finding the
circuits split into two major camps), with Brown, supra note 98, at 464 (describing a “three-way circuit split”).
183. See United States v. Turcotte, 405 F.3d 515, 527 (7th Cir. 2005).
184. See id. The Turcotte inference permits that “if the scienter requirement is met
with regard to the second part of the analogue definition (knowledge or representation of similar physiological effects), the jury is permitted—but not required—
to infer that the defendant also had knowledge of the relevant chemical similarities.” Id.
185. See United States v. Roberts, 363 F.3d 118, 123 n.1 (2d Cir. 2004) (establishing
that the defendant must know that the drug in their possession is a controlled
substance but does not need to know the identity of the drug).
186. See United States v. McFadden, 753 F.3d 432, 441 (4th Cir. 2014), vacated, 576
U.S. 186 (2015); Hofstatter, 8 F.3d at 322 (“[T]he Act deals only with chemicals
‘intended for human consumption.’ ” (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 813)); see also United
States v. Klecker, 348 F.3d 69, 71 (4th Cir. 2003) (explaining that the Act treats
controlled substance analogs “intended for human consumption” as schedule I
substances).
187. See McKinney v. United States, 221 F.3d 1343, 1343 n.3 (8th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision). In McKinney, the district judge instructed the jury to find
whether the defendant “knowingly and intentionally distributed the aminorex as
described in the indictment; and . . . at the time of such distribution, the defendant knew that the substance distributed was aminorex.” Id.
188. See United States v. Desurra, 865 F.2d 651, 653 (5th Cir. 1989).
189. See United States v. Forbes, 806 F. Supp. 232, 238 (D. Colo. 1992).
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the statute lacks any vagueness,190 obviating the need for a narrow
scienter. Given the demonstrated lack of scienter uniformity, this list
should not be taken as an exhaustive survey of pre-2015 Analog Act
scienter requirements.
B.

McFadden

The Supreme Court unsuccessfully sought to resolve this circuitfracturing issue in its first and only Analog Act opinion, McFadden v.
United States. In 2013, Stephen McFadden was convicted for selling
methcathinone bath salts. On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, McFadden
argued that the Analog Act’s scienter requirement required proof that
he knew the substantially similar structure and effects of the controlled substance analog that he distributed.191 The government, citing § 841(a)(1)’s prohibition against the knowing or intentional
manufacture or distribution of a “controlled substance,” contended
that a successful conviction only required proof that a defendant knew
a controlled substance analog was a “controlled substance” under any
law.192 Adhering to precedent, the Fourth Circuit rejected both positions and ruled that the scienter requirement was § 813’s “intended
for human consumption” requirement.193 McFadden appealed to the
Supreme Court.
Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas ostensibly rejected all
three positions and instead located the scienter requirement in
§ 841(a)(1), finding that the prosecution “must prove that a defendant
knew that the substance with which he was dealing was ‘a controlled
substance,’” meaning “those drugs listed on the federal drug schedules
or treated as such by operation of the Analogue Act.”194 This knowledge “can be established in two ways.”195 The first is if the defendant
“knew that the substance with which he was dealing is some controlled substance—that is, one actually listed on the federal drug
schedules or treated as such by operation of the Analogue Act—regardless of whether he knew the particular identity of the substance.”196 The second is if “the defendant knew the specific analogue
he was dealing with, even if he did not know its legal status as an
analogue.”197
190. See United States v. Granberry, 916 F.2d 1008, 1010 (5th Cir. 1990) (“There is
nothing vague about the statute.”).
191. McFadden, 753 F.3d at 438–39.
192. McFadden v. United States, 576 U.S. 186, 196 (2015).
193. See id.
194. Id. at 195–96.
195. Id. at 196.
196. Id. at 194.
197. Id.
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Yet the Court proceeded to note an apparent third means of proving knowledge: because “[t]he Analogue Act defines a controlled substance analogue by its features” (substantially similar structure and
effects), a defendant knowing those features “knows all of the facts
that make his conduct illegal, just as a defendant who knows he possesses heroin knows all of the facts that make his conduct illegal.”198
In a later passage, the Court reiterated that the knowledge requirement of § 841(a)(1) “can be established in the two ways previously discussed” but described these means as proving scienter “either by
knowledge that a substance is listed or treated as listed by operation
of the Analogue Act, §§ 802(6), 813, or by knowledge of the physical
characteristics that give rise to that treatment.”199
Finally turning to address directly the void-for-vagueness challenge, the Court abruptly dubbed the statute “unambiguous,” and declared that the newly announced scienter requirement “alleviate[d]
vagueness concerns” by limiting “prosecutorial discretion.”200
In a footnote, the Court approved the use of direct or circumstantial evidence to prove knowledge. Direct evidence includes “past arrests that put a defendant on notice of the controlled status of a
substance,” while circumstantial evidence includes “a defendant’s concealment of his activities, evasive behavior with respect to law enforcement, knowledge that a particular substance produces a ‘high’
similar to that produced by controlled substances, and knowledge that
a particular substance is subject to seizure at customs.”201 Another
footnote pointedly noted that the Court accepted the government’s
contention that the statute was to be read conjunctively, leaving open
the possibility that a disjunctive reading could be upheld.202
In his concurrence, Justice Roberts rejected the notion that knowledge of a substance’s identity would be sufficient, citing the rule that
ignorance of the law is an excuse when a person lacks knowledge of a
legal element.203 Roberts observed that the majority’s statements on
knowledge of identity were unnecessary to resolve the controversy at
issue and thus did not control future cases.204
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id.
Id. at 196.
Id. at 197 (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 149–50 (2007)).
Id. at 192 n.1.
Id. at 194 n.2 (“The Government has accepted for the purpose of this case that it
must prove two elements to show that a substance is a controlled substance analogue under the definition in § 802(32)(A) . . . . Because we need not decide in this
case whether that interpretation is correct, we assume for the sake of argument
that it is.”).
203. Id. at 198–99 (Roberts, J., concurring).
204. Id. at 199.
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The Court in McFadden twice claimed to describe only two ways of
satisfying § 841’s scienter requirement, but it described these two
ways in at least four distinct manners:
(1) Knowledge of Illegality. “[The] defendant knew that the substance with
which he was dealing is some controlled substance—that is, one actually
listed on the federal drug schedules or treated as such by operation of the
Analogue Act—regardless of whether he knew the particular identity of the
substance.”205
(2) Knowledge of a Substance’s Identity. “[T]he defendant knew the specific
analogue he was dealing with, even if he did not know its legal status as an
analogue.”206
(3) Knowledge of Features. The defendant knew that the analog’s structure
and effects are substantially similar to those of a scheduled controlled substance, so he therefore “[knew] all of the facts that make his conduct
illegal.”207
(4) Knowledge of the Physical Characteristics. The defendant knew the “physical characteristics”208 that make the substance a controlled analog.

Each of these means of proving scienter present major interpretive
challenges.
Regarding the first manner, knowledge of a chemical as a “controlled substance” hurtles directly into the puzzle of Schrödinger legality described above. Because the Analog Act does not expressly or
categorically outlaw any given substance in advance, one cannot know
a substance’s legal status until a jury reaches its verdict. This also
means that certain kinds of evidence the McFadden Court lists as capable of proving knowledge are, in fact, nonsensical. If the Analog Act
does not categorically criminalize any substances, “past arrests” cannot “put a defendant on notice of the controlled status of a substance.”209 Similarly, circumstantial evidence showing a defendant’s
“knowledge that a particular substance is subject to seizure at customs”210 provides equally little probative value. Arrests and seizures
are merely law enforcement predictions that a substance might be
found illegal under a particular set of circumstances.
McFadden treats the final three manners of satisfying the scienter
requirement as identical, yet they possess little actual overlap. Knowledge of identity is most easily construed as knowledge of a substance’s
chemical name, yet knowing a name does not imply knowledge of a
substance’s substantially similar structure or effects. For example,
one can determine practically nothing about a substance’s physical
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 194 (majority opinion).
at 194–95.
at 196.
at 192 n.1.
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characteristics or substantial similarity to a schedule I or II substance
just by knowing that the substance is called alpha-PVP or gravel.211
Similarly, a chemical’s “physical characteristics” include only those
properties that one can externally observe or measure without altering the chemical’s composition or identity, such as chemical structure.212 Physical characteristics do not include the chemical’s effects
upon ingestion. Even qualified experts are incapable of properly deducing a substance’s effects from its physical characteristics alone.213
A substance can be identical in molecular structure to a scheduled
substance yet have no substantially similar effects,214 or it can be substantially similar in structure and have opposite effects.215
C.

McFadden’s Endlessly Broad Means of Proving Scienter

McFadden’s amorphous list of acceptable approaches to satisfying
the scienter requirement and equally nebulous assertion regarding
circumstantial evidence have proven so endlessly malleable as to justify almost any pre-McFadden conviction. By addressing the Analog
Act’s scienter requirement, McFadden set off a cascade of appeals216:
of the approximately 284 federal cases citing § 813,217 approximately
211. Both are names for the same synthetic cathinone once commonly sold to consumers as bath salts.
212. See Differences in Matter—Physical and Chemical Properties, CHEMISTRY
LIBRETEXTS, https://chem.libretexts.org/Bookshelves/Introductory_Chemistry/
Map%3A_Introductory_Chemistry_(Tro)/03%3A_Matter_and_Energy/3.05%
3A_Differences_in_Matter-_Physical_and_Chemical_Properties#:~:
text=summary-,A%20physical%20property%20is%20a%20characteristic
%20of%20a%20substance%20that,undergo%20a%20specific%20chemical
%20change [https://perma.cc/487R-8WK5] (July 19, 2021).
213. See United States v. Fedida, 942 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1281 n.7 (M.D. Fla. 2013).
214. Chemical “chirality” means that two substances can share an identical structure
yet induce different effects. For example, r-methamphetamine is crystal meth,
and its chiral mirror image, l-methamphetamine, has such mild psychoactive effects that it is sold over the counter in asthma inhalers. See L-Methamphetamine
(Illegal in the Mirror), SCIENCEBLOGS (Oct. 27, 2006), https://scienceblogs.com/
moleculeoftheday/2006/10/27/lmethamphetamine-would-you-bel [https://
perma.cc/8QUQ-LKBX].
215. See Andrew Payne Norwood, Note, When Apples Taste Like Oranges, You Cannot
Judge a Book by Its Cover: How To Fight Emerging Synthetic “Designer” Drugs of
Abuse, 39 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 323, 337 (2017) (comparing the structures
of heroin and naltrexone, which controls opiate withdrawals).
216. See, e.g., United States v. Sharp, 879 F.3d 327, 333 (8th Cir. 2018); United States
v. Smutek, 730 F. App’x 18, 21 (2d Cir. 2018); Aburokbeh v. United States, No.
17-3084, 2017 WL 3397435, at *1 (6th Cir. July 10, 2017); United States v. Newbold, 686 F. App’x 181, 183 (4th Cir. 2017); Jones v. United States, 650 F. App’x
974, 977 (11th Cir. 2016); Stallard v. United States, No. 14-CR-20, 2017 WL
3452356, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 10, 2017); United States v. Singh-Sidhu, No. 13CV-00032, 2017 WL 1364582, at *3 (D. Nev. Apr. 13, 2017).
217. This information is current as of January 28, 2022.
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135 were decided prior to McFadden218 and seventy-eight were decided in the three years after the decision.219 Many circuits previously
employed scienter requirements clearly incompatible with McFadden;
for example, the Sixth and Fourth Circuits had previously only required proof of intended human consumption.220 Despite the sizable
shift in the legal landscape, very few appeals succeeded.221 The Supreme Court had sanctioned almost every scienter created by the circuit courts. The only two means of satisfying the scienter requirement
that McFadden did not overtly sanction are (1) knowledge that the
substance is intended for human consumption and (2) knowledge of
the substance’s substantially similar effects, from which the jury can
infer knowledge of substantially similar structure (the Turcotte inference). Moreover, the Court expressly permitted expansive use of circumstantial evidence logically unrelated to a defendant’s intent.
D.

Post-McFadden: Scienter and Notice

Though the circuit courts have attempted to dutifully honor the
Court’s insistence that there are only two ways of proving Analog Act
scienter, a division has emerged over which two of the four means are
correct. The Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits, plus a few district
courts, have adopted the first and second means of proof: knowledge of
illegality and knowledge of a substance’s identity.222 Others, including the First, Fourth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, have
tacked toward Justice Robert’s concurrence by adopting the first and
218. To find these cases in a legal research database, search cases for the citing reference “21 U.S.C. 813,” filter for federal jurisdiction, and limit the results to those
dated before June 18, 2015.
219. To find these cases in a legal research database, search cases for the citing reference “21 U.S.C. 813,” filter for federal jurisdiction, and limit the results to those
dated between June 18, 2015, and June 18, 2018.
220. See United States v. McFadden, 753 F.3d 432, 441 (4th Cir. 2014), vacated, 576
U.S. 186 (2015); United States v. Hofstatter, 8 F.3d 316, 322 (6th Cir. 1993).
221. But see United States v. Demott, 906 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2018) (ordering a
retrial for two defendants in light of the new McFadden ruling on scienter);
United States v. Makkar, 810 F.3d 1139, 1148 (10th Cir. 2015) (overturning a
pre-McFadden conviction that was based only on the defendant’s knowledge of
effects); United States v. Stanford, 823 F.3d 814, 838 (5th Cir. 2016).
222. See, e.g., United States v. Hamdan, 910 F.3d 351, 356 (7th Cir. 2018); United
States v. Moton, 951 F.3d 639, 643 (5th Cir. 2020); United States v. Al Haj, 731 F.
App’x 377, 378 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam); United States v. Canfield, 758 F.
App’x 51, 54 (2d Cir. 2018); United States v. Turks, No. 17CR444, 2018 WL
5292540, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 25, 2018); Demott, 906 F.3d at 240–44; United
States v. Galecki, No. 15-CR-00285, 2016 WL 8732504, at *2 (D. Nev. Sept. 19,
2016) (“In McFadden, the Supreme Court recently held that in order to be convicted for a violation of the Analogue Act, the defendant must knowingly and
intentionally distribute a mixture or substance that has substantially similar effects on the nervous system as a controlled substance . . . .”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 15-CR-00285, 2017 WL 1330193 (D. Nev. Apr. 5, 2017).
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third means of proof: knowledge of illegality and knowledge of substantially similar features.223
This division in approaches is not a proper “circuit split” because
McFadden clearly sanctioned all four means of proving scienter, leaving courts to choose which two ways are preferred for any given case.
Cases within the Sixth Circuit have already employed conflicting scienter pairs. In Aburokbeh v. United States, the Sixth Circuit summarized McFadden as holding that the government must prove that a
defendant knew “the substance was controlled under the Controlled
Substances Act or Analogue Act or knew the specific features of the
substance that made it a ‘controlled substance analogue.’ ”224 In a
later case, United States v. Stallard, the Sixth Circuit restated McFadden as requiring proof that a defendant either knew a substance’s
identity or knew that it was a controlled substance.225 Reading postMcFadden appeals reveals the case’s bewildering effect on circuit
court judges.
In Demott, one of the few opinions to openly wrestle with McFadden’s ambiguity, the Second Circuit noted that McFadden actually
employs at least three definitions of what it means for a substance to
be “controlled.”226 It ultimately adopted an unusual interpretation of
what it means for a defendant to know a substance’s identity.227 Because there is no known list of illicit analogs, the court in Demott reasoned that knowledge of a substance’s name cannot establish
knowledge of identity. Instead, “the defendant must know the characteristics of the substance that qualify that substance as an analogue”—its substantially similar effects and structure.228
223. See, e.g., United States v. McFadden, 823 F.3d 217, 223 (4th Cir. 2016); United
States v. Ketchen, 877 F.3d 429, 431 (1st Cir. 2017); Makkar, 810 F.3d at 1143;
Jones v. United States, 650 F. App’x 974, 977 (11th Cir. 2016); United States v.
Newbold, 686 F. App’x 181, 186 (4th Cir. 2017); United States v. Ramos, 814 F.3d
910, 916 (8th Cir. 2016); United States v. Ritchie, No. 15-CR-00285, 2018 WL
6580570, at *3 (D. Nev. Dec. 13, 2018).
224. Aburokbeh v. United States, No. 17-3084, 2017 WL 3397435, at *1 (6th Cir. July
10, 2017).
225. Stallard v. United States, No. 17-6188, 2018 WL 1442984, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 15,
2018) (“The knowledge requirement for controlled substance analogue cases requires a showing that the defendant either (1) ‘knew that the substance with
which he was dealing is some controlled substance,’ . . . or (2) ‘knew the specific
analogue he was dealing with, even if he did not know its legal status as an analogue.’” (quoting McFadden v. United States, 576 U.S. 186, 194 (2015))).
226. Demott, 906 F.3d at 242. The court noted that “controlled” could mean (1) “knowing that the substance was generally illegal;” (2) “knowing that the substance
was illegal specifically under federal law;” or (3) “knowing that the substance was
illegal under the particular controlling statute, such as the CSA or Analogue Act.”
Id.
227. See id.
228. Id.
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In United States v. Novak, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that
knowledge of a substance’s identity necessarily implies knowledge of
its substantially similar structure and effects,229 and knowledge of a
substance was soon to be added to the CSA’s schedules qualified as
knowledge of its present “status as a controlled substance analogue.”230 A seventy-one-year-old Army veteran with early-stage
Alzheimer’s231 had received a four-year sentence for selling synthetic
cannabis made with XLR-11.232 XLR-11 was placed on the federal
schedules sometime after the defendant had stopped his sales.233 The
defendant claimed ignorance of XLR-11’s status as a controlled substance analog and proved that he had stopped selling it before it was
scheduled.234 In reviewing the circumstantial evidence supporting the
guilty plea, the Seventh Circuit found that the defendant and his coconspirator knew XLR-11 was an illicit analog.235 In drawing this conclusion, the court relied almost entirely on the pair’s Facebook announcement that XLR-11 was soon to be outlawed.236
E.

The Elasticity of Circumstantial Evidence

The most likely reason for the missing flood of reversals following
McFadden was the Supreme Court’s authorization of circumstantial
scienter evidence. Not all of McFadden’s means of proving scienter
readily lend themselves to circumstantial proof—it is difficult to conceive of how “a defendant’s concealment of his activities”237 could be
circumstantial evidence that he knew a particular substance’s chemical composition. Yet as noted in Demott, this was not a mistake: “[T]he
Court explicitly approved examples of circumstantial evidence that
would not support a logical inference that the defendant knew anything about the CSA or Analogue Act . . . .”238 Permitting such broad
use of circumstantial evidence has allowed courts to uphold almost
any Analog Act conviction. As an example, the Eighth Circuit held
that a defendant knew the chemical structure and effects of alphaPVP based on the circumstantial evidence that she sold bath salts to
an informant for cash late at night in a parking lot.239
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

United States v. Novak, 841 F.3d 721, 728–29 (7th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 729.
Id. at 727–28.
Id. at 726.
Id. at 724.
Id.
Id. at 729.
Id.
McFadden v. United States, 576 U.S. 186, 192 n.1 (2015).
United States v. Demott, 906 F.3d 231, 243 (2d Cir. 2018).
United States v. Ramos, 814 F.3d 910, 916–18 (8th Cir. 2016). Other circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s chemical knowledge included the substance’s high
price, her knowledge that it made users feel good, her willingness to meet an
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In Stallard, a petitioner appealed his pre-McFadden 180-month
sentence for distribution of the controlled substance analog gravel,
claiming that he never knew the actual identity of the substance nor
did he know that it was a controlled substance analog.240 The petitioner claimed ineffective assistance of counsel on the grounds that his
attorney erroneously led him to believe that “his knowledge that state
authorities were criminalizing the distribution of ‘bath salts’ and
‘gravel’ was enough to meet the knowledge element of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841.”241 Citing knowledge of illegality and knowledge of identity as
McFadden’s two ways of establishing scienter,242 the court denied his
certificate of appealability. The court pointed to circumstantial evidence as proof of the petitioner’s knowledge, including his evasiveness
during a traffic stop and his knowledge of the substance’s street name
gravel, and its effects.243
At least one court has even used circumstantial evidence to resurrect the Turcotte inference, one of the two means of proving scienter
not expressly sanctioned by McFadden.244 In United States v. Carlson,
defendant James Carlson and his family had sold synthetic cannabis
at their head shop in Duluth, Minnesota. At trial, the judge gave a
Turcotte instruction, permitting the jury to infer Carlson’s knowledge
of the synthetic cannabis’s substantial structural similarity to a controlled substance based on his knowledge of its substantially similar
effects.245 Carlson received 210 months in prison but appealed under
McFadden. In affirming Carlson’s guilt, the Eighth Circuit adopted
knowledge of illegality and knowledge of substantial similarity as McFadden’s two forms of scienter.246 The Carlson court recognized that
McFadden’s approval of circumstantial scienter evidence, including
“knowledge that a particular substance produces a ‘high’ similar to
that produced by controlled substances,”247 tacitly permitted continued use of the Turcotte inference.248
Finally, some courts seem to have ignored McFadden entirely, going as far as adopting the Fourth Circuit’s position rejected in McFad-

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

informant at a gas station to sell him a product, her failure to charge the informant tax, and the product’s logo, consisting of a woman and a disco ball. See id.
Stallard v. United States, No. 17-6188, 2018 WL 1442984, at *1–2 (6th Cir. Mar.
15, 2018).
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
See United States v. Carlson, 810 F.3d 544, 551–52 (8th Cir. 2016).
Id.
Id. at 550.
McFadden v. United States, 576 U.S. 186, 192 n.1 (2015) (citing United States v.
Ali, 735 F.3d 176, 188–89 (4th Cir. 2013)).
Carlson, 810 F.3d at 552–53.
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den and upholding indictments alleging only that the defendant knew
of the intended human consumption.249
F.

McFadden and Arbitrary Enforcement

By stretching the scope of permissible scienter, McFadden pushed
the Analog Act past the limits of due process and into the realm of the
impossible. Chocolate is illegal. After reading the previous sentence, a
reader cannot possess chocolate intended for human consumption
without violating federal criminal law, even if they do not know why
chocolate violates the Analog Act. McFadden requires only “that a defendant knew that the substance . . . is controlled under
the . . . Analogue Act, regardless of whether he knew the substance’s
identity.”250 Courts have treated the analog in chocolate as the legal
equivalent of methamphetamine251 and imposed lengthy prison
sentences,252 with the most recent indictment in 2018.253 Damningly,
the McFadden Court would consider these successful arrests and prosecutions as public notice of chocolate’s controlled substance status.254
The identity of the controlled substance analog hiding in chocolate
is phenethylamine (PEA), a molecule responsible for some of chocolate’s pleasurable effects.255 PEA causes stimulant effects successfully
compared by prosecution expert witnesses to methamphetamine,256
and it serves as the basic chemical scaffolding for a host of illicit substances: methamphetamine, MDMA, mescaline, and the cathinones
active in bath salts. PEA and methamphetamine are apparently so
structurally similar that one court believed the fact to be obvious to
any “reasonable layperson” who “examined a chemical chart.”257 Although chocolate only contains some one percent PEA, as one prosecu249. See, e.g., United States v. Way, No. 14-CR-00101, 2018 WL 2229272, at *7 (E.D.
Cal. May 16, 2018), aff’d, 804 F. App’x 504 (9th Cir. 2020); United States v.
Galecki, No. 15–CR–00285, 2016 WL 8732504, at *3 (D. Nev. Sept. 19, 2016).
250. McFadden, 576 U.S. at 187.
251. See McKinney v. United States, 221 F.3d 1343 (8th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table
decision); United States v. McKinney, 79 F.3d 105, 107 (8th Cir. 1996), vacated,
520 U.S. 1226 (1997).
252. See, e.g., United States v. Nunez, 57 F. App’x 776 (9th Cir. 2003).
253. See Indictment at 2, United States v. Thomas, No. 18-CR-00104 (S.D. Ala. Apr.
26, 2018) (issuing a phenethylamine indictment for .987 of a gram).
254. See McFadden, 576 U.S. at 192 n.1 (“Direct evidence [of scienter] could include,
for example, past arrests that put a defendant on notice of the controlled status of
a substance.”).
255. See DALE PENDELL, PHARMAKODYNAMIS 76 (2002).
256. See McKinney, 79 F.3d at 108.
257. Id. But see 3 GEORGE A. BURDOCK, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FOOD AND COLOR ADDITIVES
2155 (1997) (providing chemical information about phenethylamine). As a similar
example of unintended criminalization, Florida’s state analog act prohibits the
amino acid tyramine, calling into question the legal status of high protein foods
such as egg whites, yogurt, and cheese. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.03(1)(c)(66)
(West 2021).
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tor correctly observed, the Analog Act “just requires . . . a substance
that contains a controlled substance. There is no requirement or language with regards to a substantial amount.”258
Despite its illicit status, PEA is widely available in health and grocery stores as an over-the-counter dietary supplement and energy enhancer; a seller on Amazon openly touts it for its energy increasing
effects.259 The product’s recreational utility has not gone unnoticed:
one reviewer compares the experience to MDMA,260 and a potential
buyer inquired as to whether the substance can be easily consumed by
snorting.261
No legally cognizable difference exists between the synthetic cannabis sold by the Indian-born immigrant Mr. Makkar,262 the PEA sold
through Jeff Bezos’s company, and the chocolate chip cookies served in
the Supreme Court cafeteria.263 But only one of these three parties
has received the life-shattering impact of a federal prosecution. This is
the kind of arbitrary enforcement that the Due Process Clause cannot
tolerate—that people like Makkar are harshly punished while equally
deserving defendants go free. The Analog Act has delegated “basic pol258. Transcript at 20–21, United States v. Chong, No. 13-CR-00570 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 31,
2014). The prosecutor also opined that even a one in five million ratio of analog to
filler substance would permit prosecution. Id.
259. BulkSupplements.com Phenylethylamine HCL (Pea) Powder (100 grams), AMAhttps://www.amazon.com/Bulksupplements-Pure-Phenylethylamine-PowZON,
der-grams/dp/B00ENRRBYO (last visited Sept. 23, 2021) (asserting that the
product improves mood, brain health, and energy).
260. Zach, Customer Review for BulkSupplements.com Phenylethylamine HCL (Pea)
Powder (100 grams), AMAZON (May 16, 2017), https://www.amazon.com/gp/customerreviews/R352M5VX0P4DP0/ref=cm_cr_dp_d_rvw_ttl?ie=UTF8&ASIN
%20%20=B00ENRRBYO [https://perma.cc/4B4Y-3BXA] (“Holy crap it’s almost
like you’re on Molly if you take too high a dose.”).
261. Customer Question for BulkSupplements.com Phenylethylamine HCL (Pea) Powder (100 grams), AMAZON (Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.amazon.com/ask/questions/
TxVOVEBI7UH66R/ref=ask_dp_dpmw_al_hza [https://perma.cc/9RLZ-UDBJ].
262. An alarming number of Analog Act defendants are Middle Eastern or South
Asian immigrants. See, e.g., United States v. Khan, No. 17-CR-40-SCJ, 2017 WL
9605112, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 5, 2017) (“[F]our people of Indian or Pakistani
origin were indicted on the same day for similar charges based on investigations
by the same Hindi-speaking DEA agent.”).
263. The Justices’ publicly acknowledged relationship with chocolate raises the possibility that they would be ethically incapable of ruling on the law. See Tom Porter,
‘Hazing’ Rituals Await Supreme Court’s ‘Junior Justice’ Neil Gorsuch, NEWSWEEK
(Apr. 12, 2017, 11:44 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/hazing-rituals-await-supreme-courts-junior-justice-neil-gorsuch-583090 [https://perma.cc/W95W-TKPN]
(explaining that the junior Justice must sit on the Court’s cafeteria committee,
“where literally the agenda is what happened to the good recipe for the chocolate
chip cookies” (quoting Justice Elena Kagan)); see also Ellen Sherberg, A Closer
Look: Martin Ginsburg’s Oatmeal Cookies, BIZWOMEN (Jan. 14, 2019, 7:38 AM),
https://www.bizjournals.com/bizwomen/news/out-of-the-office/2019/01/a-closerlook-martin-ginsburg-s-oatmeal-cookies.html?page=all [https://perma.cc/4RX2PWXG] (providing the recipe for the Ginsburg family’s chocolate chip cookies).
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icy matters,” such as determining which substances demand the severest possible restrictions and punishments, “to policemen, judges,
and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis,”264 leaving
“judges to their intuitions and the people to their fate.”265
VI. NEW VOID FOR VAGUENESS
In 2015, the Supreme Court voided a criminal statute in Johnson
v. United States because the Court concluded that the statute violated
the due process guarantee of the Constitution.266 The statute at issue
in Johnson was the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act
(ACCA), and the Court’s voiding of the clause may provide sufficient
grounds for voiding the Analog Act. In Makkar, Justice Gorsuch, then
a circuit court judge, drew parallels between the ACCA’s newly voided
residual clause and the Analog Act, noting that it is an “open question,
after all, what exactly it means for chemicals to have a ‘substantially
similar’ chemical structure—or effect.”267
The ACCA permits enhanced sentences for felons convicted of firearm possession who have three prior convictions for “violent felonies,”
which included, under the residual clause, crimes posing a “serious
potential risk of physical injury to another.”268 “Serious potential risk
of physical injury” lacked any statutory definition. As a remedy, the
Court had developed the categorical approach to assess a crime’s risk
of physical injury.269 Under the categorical approach, the sentencing
judge would first engage in “the ordinary case” inquiry by imagining
the facts underlying an ordinary instance of the crime of conviction,
such as whether a garden-variety burglar poses a risk of confrontation
between the burglar and the homeowner.270
Next, in a step dubbed the “hazy risk threshold” analysis, the sentencing judge would decide whether the risk of injury posed by this
ordinary instance was so grave as to constitute a “serious potential
risk of physical injury,” thus qualifying it as a “violent felony.” This
categorical approach proved to be of little practical use in guiding sentencing courts, and the list of permissible residual clause considerations grew, eventually encompassing statistics, common sense
assessments, and the hypothetical secondary effects of a crime (such
as the possibility of a violent confrontation with a neighborhood watch
member during an attempted burglary).271
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972).
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1224 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 591 (2015).
United States v. Makkar, 810 F.3d 1139, 1143 (10th Cir. 2015).
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 578 (1990) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)).
See Johnson, 576 U.S. at 596.
See id. at 597.
See id. at 597–98.
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Despite numerous efforts over the course of decades, the Supreme
Court failed to provide meaningful guidance clarifying the categorical
approach. Thus, the Johnson majority deemed the residual clause offensive to due process for “combining indeterminacy about how to
measure the risk posed by a crime with indeterminacy about how
much risk it takes for the crime to qualify as a violent felony.”272 No
defendant could reasonably know how a judge might imagine a crime
or rate its risk, so the statute failed to provide the constitutionally
required notice.
As later confirmed in Sessions v. Dimaya273 and United States v.
Davis,274 two cases voiding other risk-of-harm inquiries, to be void
under Johnson a statute must require both an “ordinary case inquiry”
and a “hazy risk threshold” analysis.
The Analog Act’s substantial similarity inquiry meets both requirements four times over. Like “serious potential risk of physical injury,”
“substantial similarity” lacks a statutory definition. Therefore, the
fact finder must first engage in the equivalent to “the ordinary case”
inquiry by deciding when two molecules are so alike as to be similar.
Like the list of residual clause considerations, the number of facts considered is nearly endless: two-dimensional structure, core arrangement of atoms, structure and effects, and more. After establishing
their preferred criteria for deeming molecules structurally similar, the
fact finder must engage in a “hazy risk threshold” analysis by deciding
whether the alleged analog and a scheduled substance are not only
similar but are substantially similar.
Next, the fact finder must conduct a similar analysis of the analog’s effects, first deciding when one might consider two narcotics to
have similar effects and then analyzing whether the alleged analog
produces effects substantially similar to those of some scheduled compound. Finally, if the fact finder decides to convict the defendant, the
sentencing judge must repeat these same steps under the Sentencing
Guidelines in order to arrive at an appropriate sentence.
In dicta, the Johnson Court noted that a statute does not generally
offend due process simply because it applies “a qualitative standard
such as ‘substantial risk’ to real-world conduct.”275 Post-Johnson Analog Act decisions have latched onto these statements to conclude that
272. Id. at 598.
273. 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018). In Dimaya, the Supreme Court voided § 16(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act on the grounds that its “crime of violence” inquiry
violated the same tenets of the Due Process Clause as the ACCA’s residual
clause. See id. at 1211–12.
274. 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). In Davis, the Supreme Court voided 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(3)(B), a residual clause permitting lengthier criminal sentences for using
or carrying a firearm in furtherance of any federal “crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.” Id. at 2321.
275. Johnson, 576 U.S. at 604.
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juries may decide the question of substantial similarity because “ ‘nonnumeric,’ ‘qualitative standard[s]’ abound in our law, and are not so
inherently problematic as to independently render a statute void for
vagueness.”276 This reasoning misses the point. The Analog Act is not
vague because it contains a qualitative standard. It is vague because
the phrase “substantially similar” prevents actual notice of the conduct prohibited and permits arbitrary enforcement.
A.

The Separation of Powers and Prudential Limitations on
the Analog Act

If the Analog Act is not voided entirely, courts should at least limit
the statute to prosecuting drug chemists who create novel psychoactive chemicals designed to evade existing drug laws.277 Courts should
find the Analog Act vague as applied in prosecutions involving substances (including chocolate) that Congress opted not to criminalize
despite ample opportunity to do so. This is the approach adopted by
the only two successful as-applied vagueness challenges, United
States v. Forbes278 and United States v. Roberts.279
In 1990, the DEA investigated the Forbes defendants for legally
buying alpha-ethyltryptamine (AET) from a chemical supply company
and then selling it as a substitute for MDMA. Created by the Upjohn
Company, AET is an antidepressant that was commercially abandoned due to dangerous side effects.280 Determining that AET was not
a controlled substance analog, prosecutors initially declined to charge
the defendants.281 Two years later, prosecutors reversed position and
decided that AET was a controlled substance analog of schedule I substances dimethyltryptamine (DMT) and diethyltryptamine (DET).282
The defendants challenged the Analog Act as applied to AET. DEA
chemists testified for both sides. The prosecution’s chemist concluded
that AET was substantially similar to DMT and DET because all
three shared a tryptamine structure and exhibited some level of hallucinogenic activity, although he candidly admitted that scientists disagreed on the methodology for determining substantial structural
similarity.283 The defense’s chemist disagreed, pointing out that DET
276. United States v. Demott, 906 F.3d 231, 237 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Dimaya, 138
S. Ct. at 1215).
277. See United States v. Makkar, 810 F.3d 1139, 1143 (10th Cir. 2015) (speculating
that federal courts faced with the Analog Act might “wad[e] incrementally, in one
as-applied challenge after another, deeper into an analytical swamp” rather than
void the Act with one decision).
278. 806 F. Supp. 232 (D. Colo. 1992).
279. No. 01 CR 410, 2002 WL 31014834 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2002).
280. Forbes, 806 F. Supp. at 233.
281. Id. at 234.
282. Id.
283. Id.
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and DMT are tertiary amines while AET is a primary amine. Two
neuropharmacologists also testified that AET was not substantially
similar and lacked the hallucinogenic or stimulating properties of
DET and DMT.284
After acknowledging the propriety of the conjunctive reading,285
and that the Act possesses no limiting scienter requirement,286 the
court addressed vagueness. It first noted that while “the ‘substantially
similar’ language may be generally susceptible to adequate definition,” Congress’s use of this technical term could only be clarified by
referring to the corresponding fields of chemistry and pharmacology.287 The court seized on the lack of scientific consensus on that key
phrase’s meaning, even within the DEA itself, and predicted that
“where there is no scientific consensus, criminal culpability will turn
solely on a ‘battle of the experts’ at trial.”288 The court ultimately
found the Analog Act unconstitutionally vague as applied because a
“defendant cannot determine in advance of his contemplated conduct
whether AET is or is not substantially similar to a controlled substance.”289 Also cited in support of the court’s conclusion were the government’s prior decision to decline prosecution; that the defendants
were not drug innovators, the Act’s real target; that AET can be legally purchased through the mail; and that the government had never
scheduled AET at any point in the drug’s thirty years of existence.290
In United States v. Roberts, discussed above in section IV.A, the
district court ultimately ruled the Act vague as applied to 1,4butanediol.291 First, the court found that the lack of agreement among
experts made actual notice of prohibited behavior impossible.292 Turning to Kolender’s arbitrary enforcement prong, the court found that
the government’s definition of a GHB analog cast so wide a net as to
include common food additives, yet those food additives were not prosecuted.293 The court found that the statute’s only real limitation was
Congress’s intent to target designer drugs specifically designed to
evade existing drug law.294 However, 1,4-butanediol did not qualify as
a designer drug because it had been used for decades as an industrial
solvent. Therefore, any protection against arbitrary enforcement
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Id. at 233.
Id. at 235 (gathering textual evidence supporting the conjunctive reading).
Id. at 238.
Id. at 237.
Id. at 238.
Id. at 237 (citing Gentle v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1047 (1991)).
Id.
United States v. Roberts, No. 01 CR 410, 2002 WL 31014834, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 9, 2002), vacated, 363 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2004); see also supra text accompanying notes 103–108 (explaining the Roberts case).
292. Id. at *3–4.
293. Id. at *5.
294. Id.
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would result from “retroactive judicial decisionmaking” and not the
statute’s language.295 The court in Roberts found this feature to be
proof of “the failure of Congress to ‘establish minimal guidelines to
govern law enforcement.’ ”296
The Roberts court noted that “[n]othing has prevented Congress
from either scheduling or listing 1,4–butanediol as a controlled substance” despite the substance having been in common use for decades
as an industrial solvent and despite the scheduling of other, similar
chemicals.297 Ultimately, the court found enforcement of the Analog
Act against 1,4-butanediol as proof “that Congress has ‘impermissibly
delegate[d] basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.’ ”298
The Supreme Court has clearly forbidden legislatures from “abdicat[ing] their responsibilities for setting the standards of the criminal
law.”299 Congress violated the Court’s command by creating the Analog Act and “set[ting] a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leav[ing] it to the courts to step inside and say who could be
rightfully detained, and who should be set at large.”300 Putting the
judiciary in charge of deciding which substances are illicit is a clear
violation of the separation of powers. It is unlikely that any prudential
limitations can save the statute. However, the most convincing limitation would be to align the law with Congress’s original intent and only
prosecute drug chemists who invent novel psychoactive substances for
the purpose of evading existing laws. Congress has the power to prohibit substances as it sees fit, and it should not force that role onto the
judiciary by the passage of ambiguous legislation.
VII. THE ANALOG ACT’S CONTINUING THREAT
A.

The Analog Act as a Failed Deterrent

The Analog Act encourages the introduction of legally purchased
analogs into the American black market by failing to provide notice to
overseas distributors of the substances it prohibits.
Overseas chemical laboratories, particularly those in China and
India, supplied many of the analogs that fueled the fentanyl and bath
salts crises.301 Without an official list of suspected controlled sub295.
296.
297.
298.

Id.
Id. (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974)).
Id.
Id. at *6 (alteration in original) (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104, 108–09 (1972)).
299. Id. at *5 (quoting Smith, 415 U.S. at 575).
300. Id. (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 n.7 (1983)).
301. See Jake Schaller, Comment, Not for Bathing: Bath Salts and the New Menace of
Synthetic Drugs, 16 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 245, 248 (2013).
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stance analogs, suppliers cannot readily ascertain whether they are
trafficking in potentially illicit substances. And even if a substance
seems to satisfy the criteria for being a controlled substance analog,
suppliers cannot readily determine whether a purchaser intends the
chemical for human consumption; many analogs have legitimate uses
as industrial solvents302 or animal tranquilizers,303 and they are used
for research and development. Without intended human consumption,
a controlled substance analog remains effectively uncontrolled. Unless
an analog purchaser actually admits to intended human consumption,
even a supplier who suspected black market product diversion would
likely escape prosecution.
Imagine that in 2014, a chemical supplier in Guangzhou, China,
received an order from a Tennessee zoo offering a few thousand dollars for a kilogram of thiafentanil, a large game tranquilizer304 close
to one hundred times more potent than fentanyl.305 The supplier’s attorney approves the sale, reasoning that thiafentanil is not a controlled substance, has never been the subject of an Analog Act
prosecution, and because the purchaser intends to use the drug as an
animal tranquilizer, is not intended for human consumption. Even if
the supposed zoo turned out to be a heroin dealer diverting
thiafentanil into the black market, the chemical supplier did not violate any laws by making the sale.
Not surprisingly, prosecuting overseas analog distributors has
proven to be so immensely difficult that as of 2017, the Department of
Justice had indicted only one pair of overseas fentanyl analog distributors.306 Until Congress replaces the Analog Act with a law that produces an actual deterrent effect, the open sale of analogs will continue
unabated.

302. See World Health Org. [WHO], Gamma-Butyrolactone (GBL) Critical Review Report, at 7 (June 16–20, 2014), https://www.who.int/medicines/areas/quality_
safety/4_3_Review.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WES-FCM2].
303. See Schedules of Controlled Substances: Placement of Thiafentanil into Schedule
II, 81 Fed. Reg. 58,834, 58,840 (Aug. 6, 2016) (codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 1301, 1305,
1308).
304. See, e.g., Lisa L. Wolfe et al., Immobilization of Mule Deer with Thiafentanil (A3080) or Thiafentanil Plus Xylazine, 40 J. WILDLIFE DISEASES 282 (2004).
305. Schedules of Controlled Substances: Placement of Thiafentanil into Schedule II,
81 Fed. Reg. at 58840.
306. Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Announces First Ever Indictments Against Designated Chinese Manufacturers of Deadly Fentanyl and Other
Opiate Substances (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-first-ever-indictments-against-designated-chinese-manufacturers [https://perma.cc/B5AS-YY5M].
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The Analog Act’s Continued Existence Threatens
Emerging Psychedelic Medicine

The continued existence of the Analog Act impermissibly frustrates
critical medical research into psychedelic medicine. After decades of
relative inactivity due to legal complications, renewed interest in
psychedelic research has led to breakthrough treatments for some of
the most common and debilitating conditions: post-traumatic stress
disorder, substance use disorder, cluster headaches, anxiety, and depression.307 Due to its unusual nature, the Analog Act creates a level
of legal ambiguity that discourages active development of these
treatments.
The Analog Act hamstrings efforts to replicate in humans some of
the more surprising—and even miraculous—experiments on animals.
For example, tiny doses of DOI, one of Shulgin’s super potent hallucinogens, totally halts asthma development in mice.308 If voided, the
Analog Act would no longer act as a barrier to these kinds of
breakthroughs.
C.

The Hemp Industry Is Subject to Analog Act Prosecution

The Analog Act could be employed to prosecute the sale and possession of hemp-derived cannabinoids intended for human consumption,
potentially including the now ubiquitous cannabidiol (CBD). Cannabis
contains over one hundred unique chemicals, known as cannabinoids,309 the most famous being delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol (THC),
the molecule primarily responsible for cannabis’s psychoactive
properties.
Before 2018, the CSA’s definition of marijuana encompassed “all
parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L.,”310 making cannabis a controlled substance and thus beyond the reach of the Analog Act. The
Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 (AIA) excluded hemp—cannabis
sativa plants not exceeding .3% THC by weight—from the CSA’s definition of marijuana.311 The AIA’s definition of hemp includes hemp
“seeds . . . and all derivatives, extracts, cannabinoids, isomers, acids,
salts, and salts of isomers, whether growing or not.”312 The cannabis
307. See generally Albert Garcia-Romeu et al., Clinical Applications of Hallucinogens:
A Review, 24 EXPERIMENTAL & CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 229 (2016).
308. Felix Nau Jr. et al., Serotonin 5-HT2 Receptor Activation Prevents Allergic
Asthma in a Mouse Model, 308 AM. J. PHYSIOLOGY L191 (2015).
309. See generally Eric W. Bow & John M. Rimoldi, The Structure–Function Relationships of Classical Cannabinoids: CB1/CB2 Modulation, 8 PERSPS. MED. CHEMISTRY 17 (2016).
310. 21 U.S.C. § 802(16)(A).
311. See 21 U.S.C. § 802(16)(B)(i). Section 812(c) now also exempts hemp-derived THC
from schedule I.
312. 7 U.S.C. § 1639o(1).
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industry interpreted the AIA as legalizing the sale of all hemp-derived
cannabinoid substances or mixtures containing .3% or less THC, and
sellers began distributing cannabinoid products across the country.313
The most popular cannabinoid, CBD, which is marketed as an effective treatment for every ailment from anxiety to arthritis, quickly
grew into a multi-billion-dollar national industry.314
Yet by removing hemp and its extracts from the CSA, the AIA also
placed hemp and its derived cannabinoids outside of § 802(32)(C)’s
Analog Act exemptions. The Act expressly omits four categories of
substances. First, it excludes all controlled substances,315 meaning “a
drug or other substance, or immediate precursor, included in schedule
I, II, III, IV or V.”316 The other three exempt categories are the
following:
(ii) any substance for which there is an approved new drug application;
(iii) with respect to a particular person any substance, if an exemption is in
effect for investigational use, for that person, under section 355 of this title
[section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act] . . . ; or
(iv) any substance to the extent not intended for human consumption before
such an exemption takes effect with respect to that substance.317

Hemp-derived cannabinoids do not seem to fit into any of these exempt categories. Although the FDA approved a prescription version of
CBD, Epidiolex, the DEA considers Epidiolex and non-prescription
CBD to be legally distinct, thus preventing CBD from enjoying Analog
Act immunity based on Epidiolex’s new drug application.318
Compared to prior prosecutions for other substances, CBD provides a fairly good target for prosecution as a controlled substance
THC analog. CBD easily satisfies the structural similarity requirement, as the two chemicals are enantiomers sharing the same chemi313. Under the AIA, the same cannabinoid can be legal when derived from hemp but
illegal when derived from marijuana despite being chemically identical.
314. See generally Cannabidiol Market Growth Analysis Report, 2021–2028, GRAND
VIEW RSCH. (Feb. 2021), https://www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-analysis/
cannabidiol-cbd-market#:~:text=report%20Overview,22.2%25%20from%202019
%20to%202025 [https://perma.cc/MH2B-5U4H].
315. See 21 U.S.C. § 802(32)(C)(i).
316. 21 U.S.C. § 802(6).
317. 21 U.S.C. § 802(32)(C).
318. See Schedules of Controlled Substances: Placement in Schedule V of Certain
FDA-Approved Drugs Containing Cannabidiol; Corresponding Change to Permit
Requirements, 83 Fed. Reg. 48950, 48952 (Sept. 28, 2018) (codified at 21 C.F.R.
§§ 1308, 1312) (“[A]ny material, compound, mixture, or preparation other than
Epidiolex that falls within the CSA definition of marijuana set forth in 21 U.S.C.
802(16), including any non-FDA-approved CBD extract that falls within such definition, remains a schedule I controlled substance under the CSA.”). At the time
of this rule’s issuance, the AIA had yet to come into effect. See United States v.
Turcotte, 405 F.3d 515, 530 (7th Cir. 2005) (exploring a new drug application
exception).
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cal formula,319 their precursor chemicals are created by the cannabis
plant using nearly identical biosynthetic pathways,320 and CBD can
be converted into THC using commonly available acids.321
As for substantially similar effects, though CBD is primarily an
anxiolytic lacking THC’s immediate psychoactivity, both chemicals act
as cannabinoid receptor agonists.322 In United States v. Cooper, the
court held that a substance acting as a cannabinoid receptor agonist
sufficed to prove substantially similar effects.323 Furthermore, under
Demott’s hybrid substantial similarity,324 CBD could be deemed an
analog based on its structural similarity to THC and the similarity of
its anxiolytic effects to quaaludes or some other schedule I anti-anxiety drug.325
Despite the strength of a case against CBD, the prominence of the
national CBD market and federal agency cooperation with the cannabis industry make mass prosecutions seem very unlikely. However, as
shown by the prosecution of the synthetic cannabis industry, size is no
protection from the Analog Act, and as in Cooper, the Act’s position
toward an analog can change rapidly without impairing prosecutions.
Newer commercial cannabinoids like delta-8 THC are very vulnerable to Analog Act prosecution. Tiny amounts of delta-8 THC naturally occur in hemp, but manufacturers have learned how to
synthetically derive commercially viable quantities from other hemp
cannabinoids like CBD.326 Manufacturers contend that this produc319. Cf. United States v. Fedida, 942 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1279 (M.D. Fla. 2013) (comparing the structures of UR-144, XLR-11, and JWH-18).
320. See M. David Marks et al., Identification of Candidate Genes Affecting D9-Tetrahydrocannabinol Biosynthesis in Cannabis Sativa, 60 J. EXPERIMENTAL BOTANY 3715, 3716 (2009).
321. See Josh Bloom, CBD and THC: The Only Difference Is One Chemical Bond, AM.
COUNCIL ON SCI. & HEALTH (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.acsh.org/news/2019/04/08/
cbd-and-thc-only-difference-one-chemical-bond-13937 [https://perma.cc/VUB42KGA] (describing how to convert CBD into THC with simple acids); cf. United
States v. Fisher, 289 F.3d 1329, 1339 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding that GBL converts
into GHB when ingested).
322. See R.G. Pertwee, The Diverse CB1 and CB2 Receptor Pharmacology of Three
Plant Cannabinoids: A9-Tetrahydrocannabinol, Cannabidiol and A9-Tetrahydrocannabivarin, 153 BRIT. J. PHARMACOLOGY 199, 199 (2008).
323. United States v. Cooper, No. 14-CR-014-J-20MCR, 2015 WL 13850123, at *6
(M.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 2015); cf. United States v. Stanford, 823 F.3d 814, 823 (5th
Cir. 2016) (“JWH–018 and AM–2201 are naphthoylindoles that activate the cannabinoid receptors in the human body, producing a ‘high.’ ”).
324. See supra section IV.C.
325. See generally Harry Low & Tom Heyden, The Rise and Fall of Quaaludes, BBC
NEWS MAG. (July 9, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-33428487
[https://perma.cc/MK8U-AMJ2].
326. See Andrea Steel & Lisa Pittman, Did the DEA’s New Rule Confirm Hemp-Derived Delta-8 THC Is Illegal?, CANNABIS BUS. EXEC. (Sept. 1, 2020), https://
www.cannabisbusinessexecutive.com/2020/09/did-the-deas-new-rule-confirmhemp-derived-delta-8-thc-is-illegal/ [https://perma.cc/F5JW-2PJZ].
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tion process places hemp-derived delta-8 THC under the protections of
the AIA, and they openly sell the product online and in head shops.
Delta-8 THC is almost certainly a THC controlled substance analog. Studies indicate that delta-8 THC’s effects and potency closely
mimic those of THC327 and that the molecules are nearly identical in
structure.328 The DEA has moved aggressively to halt the commercial
spread of synthetically derived hemp cannabinoids. In August of 2020,
the DEA struck its first blow by issuing an interim final rule specifying that synthetically derived cannabinoids like delta-8 THC fall
outside of the AIA and are schedule I marijuana derivatives,329 an act
quickly met by legal challenges from the cannabis industry.330 Should
the DEA’s administrative efforts fail, the agency’s final recourse
would be prosecuting delta-8 THC manufacturers under the Analog
Act.
Similarly, THCA would almost certainly qualify as a controlled
substance analog of THC. Most dried marijuana contains a large
amount of THCA—sometimes as much as thirty-five percent—and a
relatively low level of THC—typically under one percent and often low
enough to qualify as industrial hemp.331 THCA supplies the majority
of THC responsible for cannabis’s psychoactive effect because THCA
converts into THC when heated or smoked.332 By sanctioning the sale
of hemp-derived THCA, the AIA unintentionally legalized recreational
cannabis containing less than .3% THC by weight.
The United States Department of Agriculture attempted to close
this loophole by issuing regulations stating that the hemp “testing
methodology must consider the potential conversion of delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinolic acid (THCA) in hemp into delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) and [that] test result[s] reflect the total available
THC derived from the sum of the THC and THC-A content.”333 Left
327. See, e.g., Leo E. Hollister & H.K. Gillespie, Delta-8- and Delta-9-Tetrahydrocannabinol: Comparison in Man by Oral and Intravenous Administration, 14
CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 353, 353–57 (1973).
328. See generally José Alexandre S. Crippa et al., Oral Cannabidiol Does Not Convert
to D8-THC or D9-THC in Humans: A Pharmacokinetic Study in Healthy Subjects, 5
CANNABIS & CANNABINOID RESEARCH 89, 89 (2020).
329. Implementation of the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, 85 Fed. Reg. 51,639
(Aug. 21, 2020) (codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 1308, 1312).
330. See, e.g., Hemp Indus. Ass’n v. DEA, No. CV 20-2921, 2021 WL 1734920 (D.D.C.
May 3, 2021), appeal filed, No. 21-5111 (D.C. Cir. May 21, 2021).
331. See Thomas A. Coogan, Analysis of the Cannabinoid Content of Strains Available
in the New Jersey Medicinal Marijuana Program, J. CANNABIS RSCH. 2019, at 1, 5
fig.5; see also Test Results: Blue Ox, ANALYTICAL 360 (Dec. 11, 2016), http://
archive.analytical360.com/m/flowers/631597 [https://perma.cc/A2MY-PEHL]
(finding recreational cannabis to possess .3% delta-9 THC and 23.43% THCA).
332. See People v. Korkigian, 965 N.W.2d 222, 225 (Mich. Ct. App. 2020) (describing
the conversion of THCA into THC), appeal denied, 960 N.W.2d 530 (Mich. 2021).
333. 7 C.F.R. § 990.25(b) (2021).
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unexplained is how an administrative rule could extend a substancespecific statute to also regulate an entirely different substance. The
rule’s chances of surviving a legal challenge appear slim.334
With all other options foreclosed or unpromising, THCA prosecutions could still take place under the Analog Act. THCA is nearly identical in structure to the schedule I THC and its ready conversion into
THC would weigh heavily in favor of finding it to be a controlled substance analog.335 While it seems unlikely that federal authorities
would ever prosecute the cannabis industry under the Analog Act, the
possibility remains—synthetic cannabis was also once a billion-dollar
national industry. Until the Act is void, the entire cannabis industry
remains vulnerable.
VIII. THE ANALOG ACT AND SEPARATION OF POWERS
A.

The Rapid Development Myth

The original rationale justifying the Analog Act’s implementation
was protecting the public from innovative drug manufacturers creating novel recreational chemicals faster than the DEA could schedule
them.336 Yet very few, if any, Analog Act defendants are prosecuted
for manufacturing an entirely novel recreational compound. Designer
drug dealers lack research budgets and thus find it more convenient to
identify suitable candidate molecules already discovered by legitimate
scientific research.337
The real challenge in stopping the spread of dangerous analogs is
not the pace of innovation. Very rarely do analog drugs appear without warning. While the modern pace of analog drug capitalization exceeds that of prior decades, most emerging drugs of abuse are reported
by users in response to government surveys or are rapidly detected by
international law enforcement.338 Therefore, the real challenge in
334. See Rod Kight, What Is “Total THC” and Does It Matter?, KIGHT ON CANNABIS
(May 10, 2019), https://cannabusiness.law/what-is-total-thc-and-does-it-matter/
[https://perma.cc/EY6M-8Z68].
335. Cf. United States v. Roberts, 363 F.3d 118, 125 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing 1,4butanediol’s conversion into GHB as evidence that it is an analog of GHB).
336. See United States v. Turcotte, 405 F.3d 515, 518 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[The Act was]
Congress’s attempt to adapt the nation’s controlled substances laws to the dizzying pace of innovations in drug technology.”).
337. See Kau, supra note 39, at 1083–85, 1094–95. “Virtually all ‘designer drugs’ are
either legitimate pharmaceutical products on the market or potential products
that were synthesized in medical research and development but discarded because they didn’t produce an intended effect.” Id. at 1083 (footnote omitted).
338. See Salma M. Khaled et al., The Prevalence of Novel Psychoactive Substances
(NPS) Use in Non-Clinical Populations: A Systematic Review Protocol, SYSTEMATIC REVS., 2016, at 1, 2.
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stopping the spread of dangerous analogs is Congress’s apparent lack
of interest to do so.339
Almost all of the well-known analogs have existed for decades.
Synthetic cannabinoids were described in academic literature long
before they were marketed as Spice in head shops and gas stations.
Pfizer invented a number of them as far back as the 1970s.340 Professor John Huffman invented hundreds of synthetic cannabinoids and
meticulously documented their properties in his academic articles.341
Many of the drugs even bear his initials, such as JWH-018.342 And a
drug’s black-market potential may not be immediately apparent.
JWH-018 first appeared in commercially distributed synthetic cannabis in 2008.343 European countries banned JWH-018 almost immediately, but three years passed before the DEA finally emergency
scheduled the substance.344
DEA-consulting chemist Alexander Shulgin created scores of
psychedelic analogs and self-published multiple encyclopedic guides
describing their syntheses and effects.345 Some of his creations are
scheduled, but many nearly identical substances are not. For example,
2,5-dimethoxy-4-iodoamphetamine (DOI) and 4-chloro-2,5-dimethoxyamphetamine (DOC) are nearly identical super-potent hallucinogenic
amphetamines that can cause day-long hallucinations from milligram
339. Cf. Timothy P. Stackhouse, Note, Regulators in Wackyland: Capturing the Last of
the Designer Drugs, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 1105, 1117–18 (2012) (acknowledging U.S.
failure to promptly regulate bath salts and synthetic cannabis).
340. See EUR. MONITORING CTR. FOR DRUGS & DRUG ADDICTION, UNDERSTANDING THE
‘SPICE’ PHENOMENON 9 (Off. Publ’ns Eur. Cmties, 2009), https://
www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/thematic-papers/understanding-spice-phenomenon_en [https://perma.cc/E24Z-X7Y9].
341. See generally Terrence McCoy, How This Chemist Unwittingly Helped Spawn the
Synthetic Drug Industry, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 2015), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/how-a-chemist-unwittingly-helpedspawn-the-synthetic-drug-epidemic/2015/08/09/94454824-3633-11e5-9739170df8af8eb9_story.html [https://perma.cc/YVN9-GBDA?type=image].
342. See Government’s Opposition in Response to Defendant’s Motion to Limit Testimony of Dr. Jordan Trecki, supra note 146, at 5; Jenny L. Wiley et al., Hijacking
of Basic Research: The Case of Synthetic Cannabinoids, RTI PRESS, Nov. 2011, at
2, https://www.rti.org/sites/default/files/resources/op-0007-1111-wiley.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/N3HY-L2UA]; John W. Huffman et al., 3-Indolyl-1-Naphthylmethanes:
New Cannabimimetic Indoles Provide Evidence for Aromatic Stacking Interactions with the CB1 Cannabinoid Receptor, 11 BIOORGANIC & MED. CHEMISTRY 539
(2002); see also Jennifer M. Frost, Indol-3-yl-Tetramethylcyclopropyl Ketones: Effects of Indole Ring Substitution on CB2 Cannabinoid Receptor Activity, 51 J.
MED. CHEMISTRY 1904 (2008) (finding indole ring substitutions on CB2 generally
detrimental to agonist activity).
343. See EUR. MONITORING CTR. FOR DRUGS & DRUG ADDICTION, supra note 340, at 3.
344. See 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11(g)(3) (2020).
345. See generally SHULGIN & SHULGIN, supra note 81.
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doses. DOC is a schedule I substance, yet DOI is only regulated by the
Analog Act.346
The synthetic cathinone analogs in bath salts are also not new discoveries. United States v. Hofstatter, decided in 1993, upheld convictions for the attempted manufacture of synthetic cathinone
analogs.347 Yet these analogs were not properly scheduled until decades later and only after the emergence of the bath salts industry.348
European law enforcement first seized mephedrone, one of the more
popular cathinones found in bath salts, in November of 2007. Individual members of the European Union responded by criminalizing the
substance, with the first prohibitions passed in 2008.349 The United
States delayed its response, finally emergency scheduling mephedrone
in late 2011.350
B.

Fatal Delay in Scheduling Fentanyl Analogs

Law enforcement’s most costly mistake was the failure to respond
swiftly to the threat posed by fentanyl analogs. The majority of the
over 600 existing fentanyl analogs351 were invented in the 1960s and
1970s by Belgian physician Paul Janssen.352 In 1975, Shulgin predicted fentanyl’s eventual domination of the opioid black market, citing its comparative ease of production and profit margins.353
Producing a kilogram of heroin requires growing tens of thousands of
opium poppies, collecting the raw opium from the mature poppy pods,
346. See 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11 (2020).
347. United States v. Hofstatter, 8 F.3d 316, 322 (6th Cir. 1993).
348. See Placement of Synthetic Cannabinoids on Controlled Substance Schedule, 76
Fed. Reg. 65371, 65371–74 (Oct. 21, 2011) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11
(2021)).
349. See Europol–EMCDDA Joint Report on a New Psychoactive Substance: 4Methylmethcathinone (Mephedrone), EUR. MONITORING CTR. FOR DRUGS & DRUG
ADDICTION 16 (2010), www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/publications/559/
2010_Mephedrone_Joint_report_279863.pdf [https://perma.cc/UQ9B-V8C7].
350. See Press Release, Drug Enf’t Admin., Chemicals Used in “Bath Salts” Now
Under Federal Control and Regulation (Oct. 21, 2011), https://www.dea.gov/
press-releases/2011/10/21/chemicals-used-bath-salts-now-under-federal-controland-regulation [https://perma.cc/THH3-5SLB].
351. See Fentanyl, Fentanyl Analogues, and Synthetic Cannabinoids: Public Hearing
Before the U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, 115th Cong. 3 (2017) (statement of Barry K. Logan, Chief Scientist, NMS Labs, Inc.).
352. See generally U.N. Off. on Drugs & Crime, Recommended Methods for the Identification and Analysis of Fentanyl and Its Analogues in Biological Specimens, 1,
U.N. Doc. ST/NAR/53 (2017), https://www.unodc.org/documents/scientific/Recommended_methods_for_the_identification_and_analysis_of_Fentanyl.pdf [https://
perma.cc/GAF5-66FN]. For a history of fentanyl development and use, see Theodore H. Stanley, The Fentanyl Story, 15 J. PAIN 1215 (2014).
353. See BRYCE PARDO ET AL., THE FUTURE OF FENTANYL AND OTHER SYNTHETIC
OPIOIDS 45, 72 (2019), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR3100/RR3117/RAND_RR3117.pdf [https://perma.cc/39BP9J8W].
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and refining the opium into heroin in a laboratory. By contrast, a kilogram of fentanyl requires some precursor chemicals, a laboratory, and
minimal chemical expertise, and it yields many times more doses than
an equivalent amount of heroin.
Despite this risk, the majority of fentanyl analogs were never
scheduled. A handful were scheduled after the first fentanyl crisis in
the early 1980s. But between 1988 and 2014, the DEA and Congress
abandoned efforts to control fentanyl, scheduling only two synthetic
fentanyl analogs.354 One of the many analogs to go unscheduled was
acetylfentanyl, a drug that is five to fifteen times more potent than
heroin. In 2013, acetylfentanyl ravaged the eastern United States,
killing dozens of opiate users in Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, and New
Orleans.355 The drug was finally added to schedule I in 2015, more
than two years after the first known fatal overdose.356
In 2013, there were 945 forensic cases in the United States involving fentanyl analogs. By 2017, that number had risen to 71,341. Despite the dramatic increase in cases, the United States waited until
2018 before emergency scheduling all fentanyl analogs.357 By comparison, China had outlawed many fentanyl analogs in 2015.358 Even
black-market drug distributors moved quicker than the DEA in providing protections against dangerous fentanyl analogs. In 2016, the
first dark web markets categorically banned the sale of fentanyl analogs “[d]ue to recent deaths and the threat to customers’ well-being,” a
policy adopted by many other dark web markets.359
354. See Patil Armenian et al., Fentanyl, Fentanyl Analogs and Novel Synthetic
Opioids: A Comprehensive Review, NEUROPHARMACOLOGY, Oct. 2017, at 1, 4.
355. See Matthew J. Lozier et al., Acetyl Fentanyl, a Novel Fentanyl Analog, Causes 14
Overdose Deaths in Rhode Island, March–May 2013, 11 J. MED. TOXICOLOGY 208,
208 (2015).
356. See Armenian et al., supra note 354, at 4.
357. See 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11 (2020).
358. See Sara Ganim, China’s Fentanyl Ban a ‘Game-Changer’ for Opioid Epidemic,
DEA Officials Say, CNN HEALTH (Feb. 16, 2017, 4:52 PM), https://www.cnn.com/
2017/02/16/health/fentanyl-china-ban-opioids/index.html [https://perma.cc/4ZJYA8PC]. China implemented a blanket ban on fentanyl analogs in 2019. See Vanda
Felbab-Brown, Fentanyl and Geopolitics: Controlling Opioid Supply from China,
BROOKINGS INST., July 22, 2020, at 1, 9, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2020/07/8_Felbab-Brown_China_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3VC-P7QT]
(recounting the history of Chinese policy regarding fentanyl).
359. Joseph Cox, Dark Web Market Bans Synthetic Opioid Fentanyl After Recent
Deaths, VICE (Aug. 31, 2016, 8:15 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/ezp5vj/
dark-web-market-bans-synthetic-opioid-fentanyl-after-recent-deaths [https://
perma.cc/JFS8-7ZMB]. Dark web markets are online marketplaces that use cryptography to shield transactions, thereby facilitating the anonymous sale of recreational chemicals and other illicit goods. See Ahmed Ghappour, Searching Places
Unknown: Law Enforcement Jurisdiction on the Dark Web, 69 STAN. L. REV.
1075, 1077–90 (2017) (describing dark web markets).
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The number of Americans who lost their lives due to the government’s failure to schedule fentanyl analogs will never be known.360
The CDC has repeatedly warned that “[m]ore timely and comprehensive surveillance data . . . are urgently needed to curb deaths involving
prescription and illicit opioids, specifically [fentanyls].”361 The unexplained deaths of opiate users provide the first real clue to the arrival
of a novel fentanyl analog on the black market. However, in the
United States, up to one quarter of all drug overdoses lack any identified drug on the death certificate.362 Exotic fentanyls like
acetylfentanyl typically escape postmortem detection because of their
obscurity and because they are intermixed with more common and
readily identifiable narcotics.363
It must also be noted that, as a public health protection, the Analog
Act’s limited scope renders it ineffective against chemicals structurally unrelated to schedule I or II substances. U-47700,364 a synthetic
opioid surpassing heroin’s potency, bears no structural resemblance to
morphine or other scheduled opioids, and it went unregulated until an
emergency DEA scheduling in 2016. By then, U-47700 had already
360. See, e.g., Armenian et al., supra note 354, at 4 (“It is believed that the magnitude
of this outbreak is underappreciated since acetylfentanyl is not routinely monitored by clinical and forensic toxicology laboratories.”).
361. Lawrence Scholl et al., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Drug and OpioidInvolved Overdose Deaths—United States, 2013–2017, 67 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1419, 1419 (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/67/
wr/pdfs/mm675152e1-H.pdf [https://perma.cc/HEJ8-DQUR]. While the DEA’s
National Forensic Laboratory Information System (NFLIS) aggregates some
state and federal drug data, it does not collect the comprehensive post-mortem
toxicology data required for early detection of novel psychoactive substances. See
NFLIS Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), NAT’L FORENSIC LAB’Y INFO. SYS.,
https://www.nflis.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/faq.xhtml [https://perma.cc/3MGWSBBL] (last visited Aug. 30, 2021).
362. See Svetla Slavova et al., Drug Overdose Deaths: Let’s Get Specific, 130 PUB.
HEALTH REP. 339, 339 (2015) (“Previous work has shown that about 25% of U.S.
overdose deaths had no drugs specified on the death certificate . . . .”). This number has steadily fallen, reaching twelve percent in 2017. See Scholl et al., supra
note 361, at 1426.
363. See, e.g., Jane Mounteney et al., Fentanyls: Are We Missing the Signs? Highly
Potent and on the Rise in Europe, 26 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 626, 628 (2015) (“The
toxicity of these drugs mean that evidence of their use is often first documented
through mortality data.”); Michael H. Baughmann & Gavril W. Pasternak, Novel
Synthetic Opioids and Overdose Deaths: Tip of the Iceberg?, 43 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY REVS. 216, 216 (2018) (“The role of NSOs in opioid overdose
deaths is difficult to determine, because the substances are not detected by standard toxicology screens, which rely on immunoassays sensitive to heroin, its metabolites, and chemically related compounds.”); Amanda L.A. Mohr et al.,
Analysis of Novel Synthetic Opioids U-47700, U-50488 and Furanyl Fentanyl by
LC–MS/MS in Postmortem Casework, 40 J. ANALYTICAL TOXICOLOGY 709, 716
(2016).
364. See generally Saeed K. Alzghari et al., U-47700: An Emerging Threat, 9 CUREUS 1
(Oct. 22, 2017) (describing the rise of U-47700).
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saturated the black market and contributed to the deaths of at least
forty drug users that year,365 including the singer Prince.366 MT-45,
another opioid structurally unrelated to fentanyl or other scheduled
drugs, was first reported in 2013367 but not banned until 2018.
C.

Substances Requiring Emergency Scheduling

Congress still refuses to properly regulate dangerous, novel
psychoactive substances despite the very real threats of death and addiction. Some of the most obvious candidates for scheduling include
flualprazolam, norfludiazepam, and the numerous other unregulated
benzodiazepines that are widely available from online merchants. The
Analog Act does not encompass benzodiazepine analogs because all
benzodiazepines are on schedule IV. Unscheduled benzodiazepine
analogs have been circulating freely in the American and European
recreational drug markets since at least the early 2010s.368 One unscheduled benzodiazepine analog, etizolam, has recently eclipsed the
more familiar drug ketamine, with the DEA reporting thousands of
seizures in 2019.369
Another candidate for emergency scheduling, W-18, was discovered in the 1980s by a group of Canadian scientists searching for alternative analgesics. Early tests revealed W-18 to have 10,000 times
the pain-killing effect of morphine.370 The drug first appeared on the
black market sometime after 2010 and has been found across Canada
365. See Mike A. Mojica et al., Designing Traceable Opioid Material Kits To Improve
Laboratory Testing During the U.S. Opioid Overdose Crisis, 317 TOXICOLOGY LETTERS 53, 55 tbl.1 (2019).
366. See Mary Emily O’Hara, U-47700: Everything You Need To Know About New
Deadly Drug, ROLLING STONE (Oct. 4, 2016, 7:46 PM), https://
www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/u-47700-everything-you-need-toknow-about-deadly-new-drug-187042/ [https://perma.cc/LLU3-7QT2].
367. See Special Report: Opiates and Related Drugs Reported in NFLIS, 2009–2014,
NAT’L FORENSIC LAB’Y INFO. SYS. (2017).
368. See A Review of the Evidence of Use and Harms of Novel Benzodiazepines, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE MISUSE OF DRUGS 1, 8 (Apr. 2020), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/881969/ACMD_report__a_review_of_the_evidence_of_use_and_harms_of_novel_benzodiazepines.pdf
[https://perma.cc/44J6-EV4S]; Adam Blumenberg et al., Flualprazolam: Report of
an Outbreak of a New Psychoactive Substance in Adolescents, 146 PEDIATRICS 1
(2020).
369. NFLIS–DRUG 2019 ANNUAL REPORT, NAT’L FORENSIC LAB’Y INFO. SYS. 8 tbl.1.2,
15 tbl.2 (2020), https://www.nflis.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/nflisdata/docs/NFLISDRUG_2019_Annual_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YN6-G8K5]. For more information about etizolam’s history and effects, see World Health Org., CRITICAL REVIEW REPORT: ETIZOLAM (2019), https://www.who.int/medicines/access/controlledsubstances/Final_Etizolam.pdf?ua=1 [https://perma.cc/XC64-YAQD].
370. See Xi-Ping Huang et al., Fentanyl-Related Designer Drugs W-18 and W-15 Lack
Appreciable Opioid Activity in Vitro and in Vivo, JCI INSIGHT, Nov. 16, 2017, at 1,
4, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5752382/pdf/jciinsight-2-
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and the United States,371 sometimes in raw powder form and sometimes in the pill form of oxycodone or other pharmaceutical opiates.372
Experts believe that W-18 caused a rash of naloxone-nonresponsive
overdose deaths,373 and it continues to appear in black market opiate
preparations around the world.374 While Canada outlawed the drug in
2016, the American federal government continues to ignore W-18.375
D.

Congress and the DEA Have Already Abandoned the
Analog Act

Congress and the DEA have already proven capable of remedying
the Analog Act’s failures by passing more drug prohibitions that target narrow categories of structurally related chemicals. Congress first
employed a narrow categorical prohibition in the Synthetic Drug
Abuse Prevention Act of 2012 (SDAPA), a CSA amendment adding the
category “cannabimimetic agents” to schedule I.376
The SDAPA defines a cannabimimetic agent as “any substance
that is a cannabinoid receptor type 1 (CB1 receptor) agonist as demonstrated by binding studies and functional assays within any of the following structural classes.”377 The statute then provides five
prohibited chemical structures, their chemical variations, and a list of
fifteen chemicals illustrating the kind of chemicals prohibited.378 This
kind of precise statutory language remedies many of the practical notice issues plaguing the Analog Act. By providing scientific standards

371.

372.
373.

374.
375.
376.
377.
378.

97222.pdf [https://perma.cc/YRK2-DW9R]. Although it was once believed to be a
super potent opioid, no one understands how W-18 works. Id.
See Bryan X. McCrone, ‘Super Strong’ Drug Called W-18 Has Area Cops on High
Alert, NBC PHILA. (May 6, 2016, 11:50 AM), https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/
news/local/Super-Strong-Drug-Opioid-W-18-Has-Philadelphia-Region-on-HighAlert-378286811.html [https://perma.cc/8BKE-MF67].
Canadian authorities seized W-18 that was being sold as fentanyl shaped like
OxyContin. See W-18, STREETDRUGS, https://www.streetdrugs.org/w-18/ [https://
perma.cc/N78K-L2EQ] (last visited Aug. 30, 2021).
See Sandy Scarmack, Pa. Officials Warn of Dozens of Deaths from Carfentanil, W18, EMS WORLD (Aug. 6, 2016), https://www.hmpgloballearningnetwork.com/site/
emsworld/news/12241694/pa-officials-warn-of-dozens-of-deaths-from-carfentanilw-18 [https://perma.cc/NZ5Y-DDPD].
See generally Maarten Degreef et al., Determination of Ocfentanil and W-18 in a
Suspicious Heroin-Like Powder in Belgium, 37 FORENSIC TOXICOLOGY 474 (2019).
See Regulations Amending the Food and Drug Regulations (Parts G and J –
Lefetamine, AH-792-45 and W-18), SOR/2016-106 (Can.).
21 U.S.C. § 812(c).
Id.
Id. Categorical substance restrictions based on receptor site activity may prove to
be the preferred method of control. For example, the Modernizing Drug Enforcement Act of 2019 proposed adding all “mu opioid receptor agonists” to schedule I.
See Modernizing Drug Enforcement Act of 2019, H.R. 2580, 116th Cong. § 2(b)
(2019).
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for measuring effects and substantial structural similarity, in addition
to examples, the statute brings actual notice into reach.
In 2017, the DEA applied a similar narrow categorical prohibition
when it employed its emergency scheduling power to move all fentanyl
analogs to schedule I. Instead of prohibiting chemicals “substantially
similar” to fentanyl, the DEA defined illicit fentanyl analogs by
describing five chemical modifications to the basic fentanyl structure,
such as “[r]eplacement of the N-propionyl group by another acyl
group.”379 The notice outlaws all fentanyl analogs matching this
description, even if the DEA cannot yet name those molecules. However, the rule also affirms that the DEA will update the Federal Register and the DEA website to list any new fentanyl analogs falling
within these parameters.
The passage of the SDAPA and the categorical fentanyl ban tacitly
admit the Analog Act’s failure; all of the substances barred by both
prohibitions were, in theory, already schedule I controlled substance
analogs. Were the Analog Act an effective deterrent and prosecutorial
tool, prohibiting a range of substances already ostensibly outlawed by
the Act would be redundant and unnecessary.
The DEA has voiced concerns that it may be unable to provide the
proof-of-abuse potential and lack of medical application required to
permanently schedule fentanyl analogs.380 The agency called upon
Congress to permanently schedule fentanyl analogs via legislation,
warning that it would be forced to resort to the Analog Act if the emergency scheduling expired. Congress declined, citing serious legal concerns about the legislation’s scope and punishments, as well as the
possibility that the Act will ban medically useful chemicals.381 It did,
however, extend the temporary ban until 2021.
E.

Life Without the Analog Act

For nearly four decades, Congress has shirked its responsibility to
enact criminal legislation by using the Analog Act to put judges in
charge of criminalizing substances on an ad hoc basis. Congress, not
379. Schedules of Controlled Substances: Placement of Four Specific Fentanyl-Related
Substances in Schedule I, 86 Fed. Reg. 14707, 14710 (Mar. 18, 2021) (codified at
21 C.F.R. § 1308.11 (2021)).
380. Scheduling an unknown range of substances that have yet to threaten public
health seems to exceed the enabling statute’s scope, which permits only emergency scheduling of “a substance,” not multiple substances or a class of substances, “on a temporary basis [when] necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to
the public safety.” 21 U.S.C. § 811(h)(1).
381. See JOANNA R. LAMPE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10404, AN EXPIRATION DATE FOR
TEMPORARY CONTROL OF FENTANYL ANALOGUES 3–4 (2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10404 (explaining the administrative
and legislative scheduling processes and the difficulty of scheduling fentanyl
analogs).
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the judiciary, is the constitutionally appropriate body for regulating
hazardous substances. Voiding the Analog Act would immediately restore the separation of powers by placing the burden of criminal legislation back onto Congress.
As a practical matter, voiding the Analog Act will have little effect
on the spread of illicit substances. Analog Act prosecutions are already
rare, and the statute’s weak deterrent effect proved incapable of
preventing the spread of bath salts, synthetic cannabis, and unscheduled fentanyl analogs. In the event of the Analog Act’s repeal,
the DEA already has a due process-compliant tool for prohibiting dangerous substances: emergency scheduling. Scheduling individual
chemicals permits swift and nearly unilateral DEA action, requiring
only minimal notice and a brief waiting period, all without the need or
opportunity for judicial review.382
The DEA has recently proven willing to rely on rapid, single-substance emergency scheduling instead of the Analog Act. In 2019, researchers discovered that an unscheduled and highly potent
benzimidazole opioid, isotonitazene, was being sold on the recreational drug market and killing opiate users.383 The DEA employed
emergency scheduling to ban the drug by July of 2020, a remarkably
swift reaction time given the recency of the drug’s emergence.
Emergency scheduling also avoids the overbreadth defects common
to standards-based approaches while providing the constitutionally
required actual notice of prohibition. Critically, emergency scheduling
only imposes a temporary ban of up to three years. Opting for permanent prohibition requires the strategic devotion of agency resources to
scientific research and the rigors of administrative rulemaking. Law
enforcement must be incentivized to focus on substances posing an actual risk to public health and ignore harmless recreational drugs.
IX.

CONCLUSION

Until Congress takes legislative action against emerging dangerous analogs, only liberal use of the DEA’s emergency scheduling power
can protect the public while comporting with the Constitution’s due
process requirement. However, if drug development outpaces the
DEA’s regulatory ability, decriminalization will provide the only effective and constitutional means of insulating drug users from dangerous, novel psychoactive substances. Cannabis, LSD, psilocybin, and
many other schedule I substances have been used with relative safety
for decades, and they are far safer than the gray market analog drugs
382. See id.
383. See Peter Blanckaert et al., Report on a Novel Emerging Class of Highly Potent
Benzimidazole NPS Opioids: Chemical and in Vitro Functional Characterization
of Isotonitazene, 12 DRUG TEST ANALYTICS 422, 422–23 (2020).
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sold as substitutes. Compared to fentanyl analogs, even heroin
presents a safer means of satisfying an opioid addiction.
Whether it employs the traditional void-for-vagueness doctrine,
the Johnson trilogy, or the legal superposition rationale, the Supreme
Court should void the Analog Act at the earliest opportunity. The Constitution places the responsibility of establishing criminal laws and
penalties on Congress, not the judiciary. The Analog Act improperly
tasks the judicial branch with scheduling analog drugs on an ad hoc
basis, and it casts so wide a net as to reach practically every American. Temporarily scheduling substances through prosecution fails to
provide actual notice of the prohibited behavior. Given the minuscule
volume of overall prosecutions, the statute’s tacit abandonment by
Congress and the DEA, and the existence of more effective enforcement mechanisms, voiding the Act poses no meaningful threat to public safety. Congress should not be allowed to continue shirking its
responsibility to enact constitutionally compliant drug laws.

